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ABSTRACT 
 
Cynthia A. Current: Technology and the Archive: Framing Identity in American Literature, 
1880-1914 
(Under the direction of John McGowan) 
 
 
Through the works of William Wells Brown, Mark Twain, and Pauline E. Hopkins, this 
dissertation explores how the ways that the self is understood and lived changes in relation to 
the reception of Darwinian thought, to the introduction of new technologies for determining 
identity and for organizing information, and to new modes of categorization in the United 
States in the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century. From genre development to 
fingerprinting to genetic engineering, it is the ability to control information concerning 
identity over time that comes to matter to the authors I work with in this project. 
Because these issues have an obvious relevance to today’s information age and to 
current-day genomics, I consider those connections in my final chapter through an analysis of 
Octavia Butler’s 1987 novel Dawn. In this final chapter, I further explore how individuals 
and groups are positioned relative to the acquisition, control, ownership, and reproduction of 
knowledge, and how such organizations of knowledge become emergently instrumentalized 
and affect race, gender, and identity. The term I use to describe these associations, in relation 
to the work of Butler and how it reflects back upon the other works discussed in this project, 
is technicity.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 The topic this dissertation explores is how the ways that the self is understood and 
lived changes in relation to the reception of Darwinian thought, to the introduction of new 
technologies for determining identity and for organizing information, and to new modes of 
categorization in the United States in the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century.  
Because these issues have an obvious relevance to today’s information age and to current-
day genomics, I consider those connections in my final chapter. 
 
Evolution Theory and Darwinian Thought  
As Cuddy and Roche remark in the introduction to Evolution and Eugenics in 
American Literature and Culture, 1880-1940, Charles Darwin, with the publication of Origin 
of the Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871) “applied some of his most daring and 
challenging concepts to human life, and these ideas became an integral part of education, the 
emerging social sciences, and popular culture such as newspapers and magazines.”1 Their 
research describes how scientific and cultural understandings of evolutionary theory in the 
nineteenth century come to increasingly affect definitions and applications of terms such as 
classification, competition, progress, reproduction, and survival of the fittest especially in the 
formation and role of the pseudo-science of eugenics in American culture and literature. 
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While Darwin could be interpreted as having introduced a deterministic view of 
nature, natural and sexual selection instead invoke the indeterminacy and randomness of 
chance, along with a complex rendering of necessity. The concept of determinism rests upon 
the notion of a well-defined world fixed by natural laws. The past, then, takes on especial 
temporal importance since the past is a completed state that necessarily induces a set of 
conditions that determine present and future events. When the randomness and chance of 
variation, natural selection, and sexual selection are introduced, however, the past itself 
comes to rest upon what seem to be indeterminate values, and such indeterminacy, to 
complicate matters more, is inheritable. Thus, chance induces order—a variation becomes 
used and selected—while disrupting determinable notions about both the past and the future. 
Additionally, since descent is only “seen” retrospectively, it is the later states, the present and 
the future that come to fix the past, rather than the past being the concept that fixes the 
future: the manner in which the authors in my project structure inheritance and temporality 
often rely upon the uptake of such ideas from evolutionary theory. 
 As important as many consider Darwinian thought to be for American authors in this 
period, no one theory of cultural or biological evolution dominates the texts in my 
dissertation. In fact, Herbert Spencer, who was well known in the United States in the 
nineteenth century, published widely read accounts of evolutionary theory that differed 
significantly from what Darwin would come to formulate. Spencer developed a theory of 
evolution and the unification of natural law across all social and scientific disciplines, prior 
to the publication of Origin of the Species, that incorporated Lamarckian use-inheritance, and 
only later with reluctance, included natural selection as Darwin’s theories became 
increasingly popular. 2 Though Spencer is credited with introducing the phrase “survival of 
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the fittest,”3 he does not endorse evolution through competition and individuation. Instead, as 
Mark Francis notes, Spencer promotes “the living promise of a benign future” where 
negative social attributes would, over time, give way to a harmonious, nonviolent society.4 
By the 1880s, however, Spencer’s work reflects a growing lack of confidence in the idea of 
progress. In the revisions to First Principles in the 1880s, Spencer adds the notion of 
dissolution to evolution since the progress he thought he would witness was not coming to 
pass.5  
 
Information and Technicity 
While much of the literary criticism that attempts to engage with the resonance 
between literature and the technological and scientific developments of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries has done so through Darwinian interpretations of texts, Phillip 
Thurtle’s work on “genetic rationality” is notable for its analysis of the multiple forms of 
information management that come to affect a broad range of scientific and cultural 
development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Inventions and innovations 
as mundane as file cabinets, the organization of labor and time through middle managers, and 
the use of abstract notation allow for larger tracts and fields of information to be catalogued 
and engaged with.6 As Thurtle notes, the “informational complexity of our stories about our 
bodies depends on the amount of informational complexity we are able to organize outside of 
our bodies.”7  
Of note is Thurtle’s focus on “informational” rather than biological complexity. This 
distinction is initially surprising in light of how Darwinism and other forms of evolutionary 
theory introduce the problem in the nineteenth century of labile human essence, a problem 
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generally analyzed through its effects on biology, inheritance, speciation, and temporality. If 
evolutionary theory breaks through lines such as that between humans and other animals, and 
trait development over time, the informational and technological shifts that accompany 
evolutionary and genetic research breaks down the line between humans and things as human 
knowledge takes on new material and technological forms. In fact, the ability to 
technologically organize increasingly vast amounts of information constitutes much of how 
we have come to relate to the changing status of what counts as human essence.  
Where Thurtle’s project falls short, however, is his failure to engage with the range and 
diversity of literary texts that could be analyzed within the rubric of “genetic rationality.” 
One of the concerns of my project, then, is to broaden the diversity of texts and genres 
associated with informational, scientific, and technological innovation. The most startling 
absence in this field in the nineteenth century is the lack of analysis concerning African 
American narrative. My work with authors such as William Wells Brown and Pauline E. 
Hopkins demonstrates, however, the complex relationship such authors have with shifts in 
informational practices and scientific discourse, theories of regional and biological milieu, 
and how such shifts not only come to affect the content of their work but also the 
construction of genres themselves. From genre development to fingerprinting to genetic 
engineering, it is the ability to control information concerning identity over time that comes 
to matter to the authors I work with in this project. Everyone’s relationship to information 
changes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; these changes are expressed 
through a variety of genres and not just through American literary naturalism, the primary 
focus of Thurtle’s analysis.8   
Engaging with an alternate range of texts and genres is not only an opportunity to 
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more deeply engage with Thurtle’s theorization of genetic rationality; it is also an 
opportunity to analyze the implications of rationality itself. The organization of knowledge 
and archives implies order, logic, and control, but the authors I study suggest that we should 
ask whether the pursuit of such organization, in and of itself, is rational. If information is 
collected just for the sake of collecting, what concerns arise when such information becomes 
newly instrumentalized, becomes more than just the fingerprinting hobby of Twain’s David 
Wilson and much much more than even the alien ooloi understand in Butler’s novel Dawn?9 
Though the fingerprints of 1894 and the genes of 1987 reflect instances of the acquisition and 
archiving of biological materials, the relationship developed within the novels to these 
materials is informational. I say informational rather than biological, because how we 
understand ourselves as biological, technical, racial, ethnic, or gendered individuals, emerges 
from our position relative to the acquisition, control, and ownership of knowledge. In turn, 
the accumulation and dispersal of knowledge, especially within the period that my 
dissertation covers, is increasingly, and more self-consciously, technological.  
The coda of this dissertation, the final chapter in which I analyze Octavia Butler’s 
novel Dawn, explores how I intend to broaden the account of what this dissertation initially 
took on—an analysis of William Wells Brown, Mark Twain, and Pauline E. Hopkins 
engagement with how individuals and groups are positioned relative to the acquisition, 
control, ownership, and reproduction of knowledge, and how such organizations of 
knowledge become emergently instrumentalized and affect race, gender, and identity. The 
term I use to describe these relationships, in relation to the work of Butler and how it reflects 
back upon the other works discussed in this project, is technicity.  
Technicity has been used to describe the instrumentality of the things we use along 
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with defining paradigms that attach importance to rationality and objectivity.10 Bradley and 
Armand suggest that technicity “names something which can no longer be seen as just a 
series of prostheses or technical artefacts (sic);” instead, it is “the basic and enabling 
condition of our life-world.”11 I argue that technicity suggests both a human state and a 
relationship to technology or the technological; it concerns the continuing emergence and co-
constitutionality of human identity in relation to technology and information. Technicity’s 
relationship to the dispersal and accumulation of knowledge circles round to reflect upon the 
assembled practices of cultural and biological adaptation over time. Technology is organized 
information. How we organize (especially, in terms of my project, how we organize through 
technologies of storing from genres to fingerprinting to DNA) is as important as what we 
know, and is also the “enabling condition” of who we are.  
 
Technologies, Milieus, Genres 
While Phillip Thurtle’s work on “genetic rationality” has served as an important 
touchstone in this project, Elizabeth Wilson’s work on affect and technology and Georges 
Canguilhem’s survey of the historicity of milieu are helpful in framing an analysis of how 
narrative both resonates with and critiques some of the informational practices of the late 
nineteenth century.12 Wilson’s work relies on Silvan Tomkins’s affect theory. As Wilson 
notes, “For Tomkins, what is calculated and what is felt are mutually entangled; what is built 
by hand and what is built by evolution may be coassembled, disassembled, 
reassembled….what makes [Tomkins’s work] relevant beyond these disciplinary constraints 
is Tomkins’ notion that there is no essential difference between the affect theory of an 
individual and theory building in the sciences….logic, affect and empiricism are not 
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strangers to one another: they are homologues. We are (all of us) feeling scientists.”13   
But what does this mean to say we are all “feeling scientists”? Or that technology has 
been “from the beginning” concerned with affect?14 Certainly, the theoretical and affectual 
investment of a nineteenth century novel or autobiography is different from that of the work 
of a nineteenth century evolutionary theorist, or (as Phillip Thurtle might note) that of a new 
class of nineteenth century middle managers. What I take from Wilson’s premise is that the 
connections between human biology and technological practice often hold a similar affectual 
content not limited by objects of study or practice.  
An example of such content that I argue comes to deeply impact the work of William 
Wells Brown in My Southern Home: Or, the South and Its People is the effects of the 
theorization and use of the word milieu across the nineteenth and into the twentieth century.15 
The term milieu migrates across the fields of physics, biology, geography, literature, and the 
behavioral sciences in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and suggests what 
theorists think of living humans themselves and how configurations of identity emerge from 
systems of thought that relentlessly attempt to catalogue and contain, contrive and control 
narratives of human development. Theorizations of milieu drive the vitalism of Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck and inform the struggle for existence of Charles Darwin; they transform the field of 
geography in the form of the environmental inclusiveness of Alexander Von Humboldt and 
rigidly structure the views of early behaviorists who viewed milieu as completely controlling 
human behavior.16 Conceptions of milieu matter in the work of Brown because milieu 
informs the structure of the genre of autobiography itself.   
The classification of a text as a member of a genre gestures toward the other texts 
included in such groupings and this in turn comments upon the construction and control of 
	   8 
information and of knowledge itself. The genre of autobiography may be a tool for 
incorporating raw experience into identity formation, but it is a tool already honed to account 
for which identities matter and how those identities should be managed. The slave narrative 
is a specific instance of such management that the work of authors such as Brown arise 
from—the information of the lives of fugitive slaves was often specifically controlled and 
formatted in a manner to support white authentication, a near annotation of experience even 
as the experience charts a dark course from enslavement to freedom.17 Following his first 
narrative, Frederick Douglass defies such constraints without essentially changing how 
autobiographical texts function: while he stresses self-authentication—a movement away 
from black authored texts relying on the framing essays of white authors to establish 
authenticity—the autobiographies that follow Douglass’s initial slave narrative make use of 
the genre in a manner that a reader would expect: they are chronological explorations that 
generally add material from the period of time not covered in previous narratives.18  
Brown, however, follows a different track which culminates in My Southern Home, a 
self-referential archive that points back to the texts of his choosing (mostly his previous 
narratives which are themselves often taken from other works). But My Southern Home does 
not simply point back: the text simultaneously refers both back and forward, disassembling 
and reassembling in a manner that theorizes on what counts materially as autobiography and 
what materially counts as both rational and affective in the present. Identity (along with 
everything else) is both accumulated and dispersed across time, but in My Southern Home, 
Brown accounts for the accumulation and dispersal within the particular developmental niche 
of the American South. Thus, like others in this period, Brown is concerned with the living 
human within its milieu. 
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Brown’s use and construction of autobiographical texts, then, not only publically 
structures his life as a fugitive slave, abolitionist, and African American, but also accounts 
for a reordering and a new understanding of what counts as the essence of identity across 
time in particular spaces. In My Southern Home, Brown engages with the dynamics of the 
seriality of identity, but rather than using the frame of a direct technological innovation, such 
Mark Twain will use with fingerprinting in Pudd’nhead Wilson,19 Brown shows how the lack 
of technological engagement, and geographical and cultural isolation, contribute to the 
degenerative condition of humans within the biological niche of the American South. For 
Brown, the effects of slavery in the United States continue to affect, well into post-
Reconstruction, almost all understandings of human cohesion. Brown debunks notions of 
human progress that arise out of popular understandings of evolutionary theory. Instead, the 
American South is a devolutionary space where the simultaneity of classification and decay 
constructs a developmental niche where no body, either black or white, is able to hold on to a 
sense of individual identity. The most Brown claims for humans is a series of types, or a 
repetition of forms, both literary and biological. Brown himself within the text is the product 
of a sequence of previous autobiographical incarnations, a sequence that finally black 
autobiography is unable to define, categorize or contain. As both black buffoon and a 
rationally abstract narrator, the autobiography diffuses Brown’s identity while centralizing 
the effects of region and repetition over most forms of individual and racial identity. Brown 
suggests that the genre that has arguably contributed most to stabilizing a black 
historiography, the specific tool that managed and organized identity both politically and 
materially, no longer works.  
If Brown’s work describes the effects of a devolutionary space where the simultaneity 
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of classification and decay constructs a developmental niche where no body, either black or 
white, is able to hold on to a sense of individual identity, Mark Twain, in Pudd’nhead 
Wilson, describes the anxiety attached to the loss of such classification and the use of the 
technology of fingerprinting to try to reframe or recontain racial identity.  
In the nineteenth century, Francis Galton (Charles Darwin’s half cousin and the 
founder of eugenics) attempted to prove that the marks upon our fingers were inherited and 
through such inherited marks not only could the identity of individuals be assured but also 
the identity of groups associated with particular classes and races. The individual uniqueness 
of fingerprints, however, did not correlate with his hopes—to not only associate a visible 
biological mark with race, but to also suggest that certain “undesirables” such as savages and 
criminals were less evolved.20 Others, however, were interested in the utility of fingerprinting 
for the purposes of identification which raised concerns on how to classify and categorize so 
much material. Fingerprinting was also in competition with other methods of classification 
such as anthropometry, a system developed by Alphonse Bertillon in France in the nineteenth 
century that came to be used internationally. Those interested in fingerprinting believed they 
had found an objective method of identification that countered the faults of other systems.21 
In Mark Twain’s novel Pudd’nhead Wilson, there is an uneasy investment in all of the 
aspects of fingerprinting noted above.  
Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894) is recognized as the first novel to use fingerprinting 
forensically.22 The specification of a new technology, however, is not merely a moment of 
innovation. Rather than simply a “[fact] of literature,” fingerprinting becomes, as genre 
theorist Yury Tyanov notes, a “literary [fact],” an element of genre development that allows 
Twain to particularly frame biotechnological and representational practices and leads toward 
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a Bakhtinian sense of the “novelization” of biology and training in this text.23 Twain’s 
speculative engagement with fingerprinting creates a system and medium to classify and 
secure particular forms of identity and memory; such forms, however, tend to reify the 
constructions of racial and gender values already inherent in science and technology, law, 
commerce, and reproduction. Fingerprinting, however, also represents the direction that 
technologies of identity would seek to employ: a movement away from direct visual 
observation of bodies, whose emergence and change over time make them difficult to 
categorize, to reliance on archives of information that become increasingly removed from the 
contexts of meaning and emergence those bodies inhabit. The archiving of identity, and the 
movement away from direct visualization, is Twain’s most prescient move. The development 
of fingerprinting parallels the development of “one drop” politics, as race becomes 
increasingly difficult to define visually. The archive itself becomes infected with the 
spectacular vitality of, and the speculation and risk within, nineteenth-century biological and 
cultural determinism. 
Pauline E. Hopkins, writing 20 years after the publication of Brown’s My Southern 
Home and six years after Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson, makes use of the materiality of genre 
and biological archives in a different manner. In Contending Forces: A Romance Illustrative 
of Negro Life North and South (1900), she notes her interest in the “great value” of fiction as 
“a record of growth and development from generation to generation.”24 Hopkins’s narrative 
of genre development includes an analysis of literature as archival, as a cumulative collection 
reflecting the social and cultural development of humans. Most importantly, Hopkins 
incorporates models of generational development within the novel itself, making use of what 
scholars such as Anne Balsamo refer to as “technological innovations” that alter concepts of 
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the “‘natural’ body.”25 Hopkins’s exploration of miscegenation as the primary reproductive 
and developmental mode of humans arising out of slavery allows her to use concepts within 
evolutionary theory as progressive tools to understand biological and cultural formations of a 
new Negro identity. The manner in which miscegenation blurs and accentuates racial 
categorization across generations functions as a developmental technology that allows 
Hopkins to highlight identity as an effect of the transmissibility of biology and culture. This 
redefinition of descent is an important tool in how Hopkins constructs gender, especially the 
gender construction of mixed race women. No longer tragic mulattas, mixed race women in 
Contending Forces move out of what Hazel Carby refers to as the position of mediation 
between the races that such women have historically represented in literary criticism.26 
Instead, these women represent the movement of the New Negro into a newly naturalized 
American body.  
Hopkins develops a model of the past that reflects evolutionary sensibilities: rather than 
defined through its completedness or determination, the past rests instead upon what seem to 
be indeterminate values. In other words, a variation may biologically arise but we cannot 
interpret the impact of that variation until we see how it is used and whether it is heritable. In 
Origin of the Species, Charles Darwin addresses this in a manner that Hopkins would find to 
be as important culturally as biologically:   
differences blend into each other in an insensible series; and a series impresses the 
mind with the idea of an actual passage. Hence I look at individual differences, 
though of small interest to the systematist, as of high importance for us, as being the 
first step towards such slight varieties as are barely thought worth recording in works 
on natural history.27  
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Hopkins combines this evolutionary sense of accumulation, passage, and indeterminacy 
within her work. Of additional importance, however, is how Hopkins structures memory 
within this network of accumulation and temporal indeterminacy. Memory, for Hopkins, 
becomes a historical and gendered object, a coproduction of the past and present that does 
not simply reside in individuals. Instead, memory is materially deployed across specific lines 
of genealogy and supported by a network of evolutionary tools. 
By the late twentieth century, Octavia E. Butler, in her 1987 novel Dawn, has shifted 
such interests in identity and developmental technologies into the biotechnology associated 
with genomics. Butler’s scale of interpretation—contextualized within late twentieth century 
developments in sociobiology, gene mapping, scanning, and database storage—transfers the 
power of the control of information and the archive into the body itself, deftly striking at the 
dynamic interweaving of essence and ownership, of the accumulation and dispersal of 
knowledge and identity, of technicity. While Twain, Brown, and Hopkins seat their critiques 
within slavery, Butler’s work portends the genomics revolution of the 1990s through notions 
of DNA manipulation and gene trading. The key historical and cultural events that effect 
authors such as Butler come about through a continuing interest in biological determinism 
arising out of animal studies and their extrapolation onto human behavior across the 
twentieth century, the wave of technological developments in molecular biology, and the 
rising trade in genetic information through genomic research such as the Human Genome 
Project (HGP) and the development of human cell lines.28 
All of the authors in my project effectively conceptualize notions of human 
biologicals, genomic capital, biocolonialism, and the technologies necessary to support these 
paradigms. They all, within their different historical contexts, note that the sequencing of 
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patterns of difference affect definitions of individual and group dynamics. How such 
information is managed continues to form the backdrop of both nineteenth and twentieth 
century texts, and how such texts cohere or elide racial and gender difference. The selling of 
what Kaushik Rajan refers to as human biologicals, the growth of genomic capital through 
the development of human cell lines in the twentieth and twenty-first century, may seem 
distantly related to Twain’s use of fingerprints; the distance, however, reflects when the sites 
of technological and biological access were developed and not the paradigm of categorization 
behind each effort.29 In other words, the desires that organize biological and technological 
identification, classification, and marketability, from the era of slavery to the era of human 
genomics, often rely on similar notions of race and reproduction—notions that work against 
what Sarah Franklin refers to as the “unexpected liveliness of the [biological] objects 
themselves.”30   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Autobiography and Devolutionary Milieus 
 
 
William Wells Brown, in My Southern Home: or, The South and its People, takes a 
literary form, autobiography, that has been expressive of the formation and stabilization of 
black identity in the United States of America and uses it to express the opposite, the 
devolution of personal, and even human, identity in connection with the American South.1 
The genre that has arguably contributed most in stabilizing a black historiography, 
autobiography, now signals for Brown a different kind of seriality of self and region. Unlike 
other African American authors whose work rises out of the tradition of the slave narrative 
and autobiography, such as Frederick Douglass who wrote a continuing series of 
autobiographies that updated his life into the present,2 Brown continues to center his life and 
his interpretation of contemporary attitudes toward culture and biology in the past, returning, 
in My Southern Home, to the era of slavery. For Brown, the effects of slavery in the United 
States continue to affect almost all understandings of human cohesion. The American South 
is a devolutionary space where the simultaneity of classification and decay construct a 
developmental niche where no body, either black or white, is able to hold onto a sense of 
individual identity. The most Brown claims for identity, or for humans, concerns a series of 
types, and a repetition of forms, both literary and biological, that have much more to say 
about the transmission of biology and culture than about individuals. Brown casts this 
argument, which concerns the crisis of identity in the post-Reconstruction South, by 
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exploring the process of how individual identity, and even racial identity, moves toward a 
Southern ethnicity.3 Southern ethnicity then comes to depict a regional degradation. While 
this engagement with regional degradation is in conversation with some popular notions of 
evolution theory, Brown is more deeply engaged, like others in this era, with the definition 
and effect of milieu and the relationships between living beings within it.  
 
Evolution, Genetic Rationality, and Milieu 
Cuddy and Roche state that Charles Darwin “applied some of his most daring and 
challenging concepts to human life, and these ideas became an integral part of education, the 
emerging social sciences, and popular culture such as newspapers and magazines.”4 They 
describe how scientific and cultural understandings of evolutionary theory in the nineteenth 
century come to increasingly affect definitions and applications of terms such as 
classification, competition, progress, reproduction, and survival of the fittest especially in the 
formation and role of the pseudo-science of eugenics in American culture and literature.5 
While Brown does not explicitly engage with theories of evolution in My Southern Home, his 
interest in the seriality of identity over time within specific environmental landscapes 
suggests an engagement with the developmental potential of the living within the constraints 
of region, biology, and culture.  
While Darwin could be interpreted as having introduced a deterministic view of 
nature, natural and sexual selection instead invoke the indeterminacy and randomness of 
chance, along with a complex rendering of necessity. The concept of determinism rests upon 
the notion of a well-defined world fixed by natural laws. The past, then, takes on especial 
temporal importance since the past is a completed state that necessarily induces a set of 
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conditions that determine present and future events. When the randomness and chance of 
variation, natural selection, and sexual selection are introduced, however, the past itself 
comes to rest upon what seem to be indeterminate values, and such indeterminacy, to 
complicate matters more, is inheritable. Thus, chance induces order—a variation becomes 
used and selected—while disrupting determinable notions about both the past and future. 
Additionally, since descent is only “seen” retrospectively, it is the later states, the present and 
future that come to fix the past, rather than the past being the concept that fixes the future. 
For authors such as Brown who are engaging with contemporary cultural and scientific 
notions of temporality and development, the effects of the cultural uptake of evolutionary 
theory are an important element when analyzing his return to the subject and time period of 
American slavery. One, a return to the antebellum period allows Brown to discuss both the 
systematic and random nature of what necessarily comes to shape the future of not only 
African Americans but America itself within the particular niche of the American South. 
Two, Brown’s narrative suggests that an interest in the evolution of a particular niche need 
not lead to the narrative of progress that dominates American society. Biological and cultural 
repetition moves the self in the South not toward individual and racial progress but toward a 
Southern ethnicity and a regional degradation that creates a lazy, ignorant, and violent variant 
of American culture. Brown makes the tension between humans as specific identities versus 
humans as biological and cultural effects an emergent and developmental feature of the genre 
of African American autobiography. He also lets this tension serve as a commentary on the 
devolution of humans and culture in the American South.  
As important as many consider Darwinian thought to be for American authors such as 
Brown, no one theory of cultural or biological evolution dominates My Southern Home. In 
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fact, rather than the evolutionary framework created by Charles Darwin, figures such as 
Herbert Spencer must be thought of as just as likely to influence American thought in the 
nineteenth century as any reaction to the theories of Darwin. Mark Francis notes that Spencer 
was “especially idolized” in the United States, and his social theories, especially in the earlier 
formations, did not rely on a Darwinian framework.6 Instead, he developed a theory of 
evolution and the unification of natural law across all social and scientific disciplines, prior 
to the publication of Origin of the Species in 1859, that incorporated Lamarckian use-
inheritance, and only later with reluctance, included natural selection as Darwin’s theories 
became increasingly popular.7 
In Social Statics (1850), Spencer’s “law of equal freedom” describes how humans 
within society would progressively adapt and enter a state of equilibrium where  “every man 
may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the possession of like 
liberty by every other man.”8 Spencer’s first full theory of evolution was published in his 
essay “Progress: Its Law and Cause” (1857) in the Westminster Review and in the initial 
volume of System of Synthetic Philosophy. Taylor believes that the body of Spencer’s 
evolutionary thought asserts that everything--from solar systems to human morality--
progressed from simpler to more complex forms causing increased homogeneity and 
individuation.9 I do not completely agree with the point of view, however. Though Spencer is 
credited with introducing the phrase “survival of the fittest,” Spencer does not endorse 
evolution through competition and individuation.10 Rather, his work, as Mark Francis notes, 
promotes “the living promise of a benign future” where negative social attributes would, over 
time, give way to a harmonious, nonviolent society.11 The goal for individuals may be 
happiness, but happiness comes by way of social evolution and its effects on behavior. By 
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the 1880s, however, Spencer’s work reflects a growing lack of confidence in the idea of 
progress. In the revision of First Principles, Spencer adds the notion of dissolution to 
evolution since the progress he thought he would witness was not coming to pass.12  
What most interests me, however, about the effects that the many permutations of 
evolutionary theory could have on authors such as Brown has much less to do with 
commanding an evolutionary reading from the text than noting the weight of similar 
concerns across disciplines. Phillip Thurtle engages with the broad patterns of what he calls 
“genetic rationality” by noting that in the late nineteenth century and on into the twentieth 
century, new forms of “informational practices” come into being that make advancement in 
genetic research possible.13 His work is particularly notable for reminding us of the series of 
personal associations along with multiple forms of information management that come to 
affect all aspects of scientific and cultural development. From file cabinets to the 
development of abstract scientific notation to the organization of labor and time through 
middle managers, informational innovation allows for larger tracts and fields of data and 
biological materials to be catalogued and engaged with. Where Thurtle’s project falls short, 
however, is his failure to engage with the range and diversity of literary texts that could be 
analyzed within his definition of “genetic rationality.” The most startling absence in this field 
is the lack of analysis concerning African American narrative especially when much of the 
discourse concerning genetics and classification comes to most deeply affect racial 
formations across what I call the long genetic century. What is additionally missing, then, 
from Thurtle’s argument, is an account of rationality itself or accounting for why exactly 
rationality should most matter.  
Elizabeth Wilson’s work on affect and technology, and Georges Canguilhem’s survey 
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of the historicity of milieu is helpful in framing an analysis of how Brown’s narrative both 
resonates with and critiques some of the informational practices of the late nineteenth 
century.14  Wilson’s work relies on Silvan Tomkins’s affect theory.  As Wilson notes, “For 
Tomkins, what is calculated and what is felt are mutually entangled; what is built by hand 
and what is built by evolution may be coassembled, disassembled, reassembled….what 
makes [Tomkins’s work] relevant beyond these disciplinary constraints is Tomkins’ notion 
that there is no essential difference between the affect theory of an individual and theory 
building in the sciences….logic, affect and empiricism are not strangers to one another: they 
are homologues. We are (all of us) feeling scientists.”15   
The term milieu migrates across the fields of physics, biology, geography, literature, 
and the behavioral sciences in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—this migration 
signals the emergent and evolving theoretical heft of the word. Additionally, the term 
suggests what theorists think of living humans themselves and how configurations of identity 
emerge from systems of thought that relentlessly attempt to catalogue and contain, contrive 
and control narratives of human development. Theorizations of milieu drive the vitalism of 
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and inform the struggle for existence of Charles Darwin. 
Conceptualizations of milieu transform notions of environmental inclusiveness for 
geographers such as Alexander Von Humboldt, and rigidly structure how early behaviorists 
theorize what comes to control and effect human behavior.16 As Canguilhem states: “We can 
clearly see individuals, but they are objects; we see gestures, but they are displacements; 
centers, but they are environments; machine operators, but they are machines. The behavioral 
milieu coincides with the geographic milieu, the geographic milieu with the physical 
milieu.”17 
	   25 
I argue, then, that the term milieu, and the conceptual territory that surrounds it, comes 
to nest within literature and is useful to literary criticism not as a helpful metaphor snagged 
from the sciences; instead, following the work of Elizabeth Wilson, the word functions 
within its historical context as an interdisciplinary, and affective, homologue, similar in 
position and structure but conceptually developing within literature and literary studies in a 
manner that adds as much theoretical weight to the term as any of the other disciplinary 
settings in which it was used. Conceptions of milieu matter in the work of Brown because it 
informs the structure of the genre of autobiography itself.  
 
Black Autobiography 
From the production of slave narratives to autobiographies, nineteenth-century black 
authors have used various modes of personal narrative in a manner that attempts to counter, 
one, the lack of identity imposed through enslavement in the United States, the notion that 
individuals of African descent are, at best, property rather than persons; and two, an overly 
determined identity based on race. Perhaps the best known of these authors, Frederick 
Douglass, forwarded a singular identity that seemed to subvert the violence and 
disruptiveness of slavery by firmly attaching a text, so to speak, to a particular version of a 
self. The imagery of Douglass’s initial 1845 autobiography, Narrative of the Life of 
Frederick Douglass, Written by Himself, remains the quintessential portrait of the heroic 
escape of a man from slavery, and Douglass’s subsequent career as abolitionist, publisher, 
orator, and diplomat, have kept that portrait singularly intact.18   
William Wells Brown, as a fugitive slave and as the writer of several 
autobiographical narratives, was well aware of the potential for the particularization and 
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stabilization of self available through autobiographical discourse. In addition to his best-
selling Narrative of William W. Brown, A Fugitive Slave, Written by Himself (1847), he 
wrote Three Years in Europe; or, Places I Have Seen and People I Have Met (1852) and My 
Southern Home (1880).  Additionally, Brown’s novel, Clotel; or, The President’s Daughter 
(1853), is prefaced by a third person account of his life entitled “Narrative of the Life and 
Escape of William Wells Brown” most probably written by Brown himself.19 In spite of 
Brown’s repeated engagements with autobiographical writing, however, his notion of what 
counts as autobiographical comes to significantly differ over time from other prominent 
African American writers such as Frederick Douglass.  
The classification of a text as a member of a genre gestures toward the other texts 
included in such groupings and this in turn comments upon the construction and control of 
information and of knowledge itself. The genre of autobiography may be a tool for 
incorporating raw experience into identity formation, but it is a tool already honed to account 
for which identities matter and how those identities should be managed. The slave narrative 
is a specific instance of such management that the work of authors such as Brown arise 
from—the information of the lives of fugitive slaves was often specifically controlled and 
formatted in a manner to support white authentication, a near annotation of experience even 
as the experience charts a dark course from enslavement to freedom.20 Following his first 
narrative, Frederick Douglass defies such constraints without essentially changing how 
autobiographical texts function: while he stresses self-authentication—a movement away 
from black authored texts relying on the framing essays of white authors to establish 
authenticity—the autobiographies that follow Douglass’s initial slave narrative make use of 
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the genre in a manner that a reader would expect: they are chronological explorations that 
generally add material from the period of time not covered in previous narratives.21  
The autobiographical format of My Southern Home, however, significantly differs 
from that of authors such as Douglass. My Southern Home is a self-referential archive that 
gestures back to a number of previously published texts. Though most of the references are 
taken from his own works, even these references are scattered across more than one text. But 
My Southern Home does not simply point back: the text simultaneously refers both back and 
forward, disassembling and reassembling in a manner that theorizes on what counts 
materially as autobiography and what materially counts as both rational and affective in the 
present. Identity (along with everything else) is both accumulated and dispersed across time, 
but in My Southern Home, Brown assembles an account that comes to more significantly 
account for human development within the particular milieu and developmental niche of the 
American South.  
Brown’s use and construction of autobiographical texts, then, not only publically 
structures his life as a fugitive slave, abolitionist, and African American, but also accounts 
for a reordering and a new understanding of what counts as the essence of identity across 
time in particular spaces. One of the most compelling features of a good deal of the criticism 
concerning the work of Brown is the manner in which critical essays methodologically 
mimic what Brown himself does: in order to deeply engage with any work by Brown, critics 
are compelled to start with a previous work, or a series of works, in order to fully explicate 
the text that is central to the essay at hand. An example of this is Paul Gilmore’s work on 
Brown’s novel Clotel. Though Gilmore’s primary point is to analyze the potential 
connections between minstrelsy and the blackface performative qualities of the male 
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characters in Clotel, the force of his argument comes from noting the use of particular 
characters and scenes in other works by Brown, and not because they simply shed light on 
Clotel; rather, the previous works are often literally, and always methodologically, embedded 
in Clotel. Though he does not directly refer to it as such, Gilmore is commenting upon both 
the dispersal and accumulation of Brown’s autobiographical identity throughout a self-
referential archive of materials, and how those materials are continually reseated within 
different cultural and developmental concerns.22 William L. Andrews describes the genre of 
the slave narrative as “a discursive instead of a documentary mode…designed to establish the 
grounds on which one may decide what will count as fact in a narrative and what mode of 
interpretation is best suited to a full comprehension of that fact:” this discursiveness informs 
all of Brown’s work even as he moves beyond the genre of the slave narrative into other 
modes of autobiographical expression.23   
The full text of Clotel marks an important moment for Brown’s developmental and 
archival reorganization of the self that, further, leads Brown to a partial novelization of 
identity formation.24 While the earlier narratives—such as the "Narrative of William W. 
Brown, a Fugitive Slave, Written by Himself" (1847) and the introduction to his novel Clotel 
("Narrative of the Life and Escape of William Wells Brown")—are written within the general 
framework of the fugitive slave narrative, the narrative that precedes Clotel suggests an 
evolving understanding of the capacity of the genre of autobiography: the use of the third 
person in this narrative, rather than the use of the first person that Brown makes use of in his 
initial narrative, represents such a shift for Brown.  
William L. Andrews states that early “Afro-American autobiography is…a mediative 
instrument not only between black narrator and white reader but also…between alternative 
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ways of encoding reality,” a discursive form engaged in elucidating new forms of factual 
comprehension.25 In the personal narrative that forms the introduction to Clotel, Brown 
pushes the boundaries of Andrew’s description of factual comprehension of autobiographical 
identity by disengaging from a first person narrative to describe himself:   
William Wells Brown, the subject of this narrative, was born a slave in Lexington, 
Kentucky, not far from the residence of the late Hon. Henry Clay. His mother was a 
slave of Doctor John Young. His father was a slaveholder, and, besides being a near 
relations of his master, was connected with the Wicklief family, one of the oldest, 
wealthiest, and most aristocratic of the Kentucky planters.26  
Disengaging from a first person textual representation of himself does more than expand 
upon forms of factual comprehension related to traditional accounts of slave narratives and 
African American autobiography. The disengagement with the first person gestures toward 
both the dispersal and abstraction of identity across the entire text of Clotel, for the account 
of Brown’s life now forms the preface of a fictional work that is itself a compendium of 
rumor and scandal concerning President Thomas Jefferson’s mixed race children along with 
the sprinkling of autobiographical references and scenes from the life of Brown himself. The 
text represents the beginning of a methodology that concerns the potent combination of what 
counts as both rational and affective in the present.  
The accumulation and dispersal of identity, then, rather than lead to a self referential 
archive that becomes factually clearer concerning Brown’s life leads instead to a clarification 
of the effects of the present that reorganize the past, and not in a manner that engages with 
contemporary notions of human progress. M. Giulia Fabi calls Brown’s move from first to 
the third person in the preface of Clotel  “a brilliant stroke of rhetorical skill” where Brown 
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“emerges as the third person ‘editor’ of his first-person deeds” (xi). While it may be true, as 
Fabi notes, that Brown’s use of the preface and autobiographical details serve to 
“[emphasize] how his novel is founded in truth,” she does not discuss how the figure of 
Brown devolves across the entire text of Clotel (nt 2, 257). 
Brown himself allows readers a direct comparison in which to consider such 
devolution. In both the introductory narrative and within the novel itself, Brown makes use of 
the episodes in which he was hired out to work for Mr. Walker the slave trader. There is a 
major shift, however, in how Brown portrays himself from the narrative to the novel. In the 
narrative, he is “William,” an individual who with great pathos relates the horror of being 
hired out to Mr. Walker to prepare slaves for sale in the New Orleans market:  
Nothing was more grievous to the sensitive feelings of William, than seeing he 
separation of families by the slave-trader: husbands taken from their wives, and 
mothers from their children, without the least appearance of feeling on the part of those 
who separated them….At the expiration of the period of his hiring with Walker, 
William returned to his master, rejoiced to have escaped an employment as much 
against his own feelings as it was repugnant to human nature. (11-12) 
In the novel itself, however, “William” is now “Pomp”  who is “of real Negro blood” with 
“lips thick, and hair short and woolly...who had seen so much of the buying and selling of 
slaves, that he appeared perfectly indifferent to the heartrending scenes” (53).27  
A similar use of an episode from his time with Mr. Walker occurs between the 1847 
narrative and its use in My Southern Home. In his narrative from 1847, Brown states that 
while working for Walker, he accidentally spills wine upon some of Mr. Walker’s customers.  
Walker gives Brown a note with a dollar to take to the sheriff where he will be whipped.  
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Brown tricks a free black into going into the sheriff’s office in his place by saying the dollar 
is to pick up a trunk. The man is whipped in his place. Of this incident, Brown says, “I know 
of no act committed by me while in slavery which I have regretted more than that; and I 
heartily desire that it may be at some time other in my power to make him amends for his 
vicarious sufferings in my behalf” (51). In My Southern Home, however, the enactment of 
this event is carried out by a slave named Pompey who shows no regret at tricking someone 
into taking a whipping for him: “Pompey often spoke of the appearance of ‘my fren’,’ as he 
called the colored brother, and would enjoy a hearty laugh, saying, ‘He was a free man, an’ 
could afford to go to bed, an’ lay dar till he got well” (198). 
Such use of autobiographical characterization introduces a serial presentation of self 
not rooted in the repetition of a singular individualistic story. Fabi is right in noting that 
placing the third person narrative alongside the novel Clotel emphasizes some construction of 
truth, but it is a contextualized truth that relies on an archive of information Brown is 
developing concerning how facts and information reside within the affect of both the past and 
present, and how that reorganization of temporality and information reorganizes 
autobiography itself.  
My Southern Home, however, engages more deeply with such concerns and moves 
discursiveness to a new level, to a new kind of factual disclosure of the seriality of identity, 
of how identity comes to be dispersed and accumulated across time. Autobiography, rather 
than a set of facts drawn from across a particularly lived life, becomes, for Brown, an 
exploration of what counts as real or rational in different contexts. Paul John Eakin's 
understanding of how narrative “makes selves” is that it functions as "not merely a literary 
form but a mode of phenomenological and cognitive self-experience." He speaks of 
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"[n]arrative and identity [as] performed simultaneously…in a single act of self-narration” 
adding that “this radical equation between narrative and identity is…not merely about the 
self but rather in some profound way a constituent part of self."28  
In My Southern Home, however, the “radical equation” evolves beyond Brown’s 
earlier engagements with individual identity and race. Instead, My Southern Home further 
radicalizes his engagement with how to informationally structure identity and how identity 
comes to reflect the dispersal and accumulation of information over time. Brown moves from 
the particularization of individual identity to demonstrate the effects of a Southern ethnic 
sensibility on both blacks and whites, and also on the American South itself.  
 
Region, Ethnicity, Devolution 
What began as a shift in relation to both third person and the partial novelization of 
self in the full text of Clotel develops into an even more marked departure from the 
individualistic in My Southern Home. In My Southern Home, Brown’s identity as an 
individual is now dispersed and variably rendered. He is both rational narrator and ignorant 
enslaved buffoon. He positions himself as something entirely new while reworking older 
episodes of his life that then differently inscribe and categorize. Simultaneously, however, as 
identity drifts away from constructing Brown and others in the text as singular individuals, it 
organizationally coheres around a singular group and regional identity, a Southern ethnicity 
that has a resonance for both blacks and whites. My Southern Home, then, coheres around a 
Southern ethnicity that documents and classifies, and secures particular forms of identity and 
memory while simultaneously calling into question the organization of information it has just 
secured.   
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An autobiography that secures a formation of identity while simultaneously calling it 
into question is not only revelatory of how the system of slavery functioned in the South for 
both blacks and whites—intense classification and depersonalization—but it also 
contextualizes the autobiography as reflective of the post-Reconstruction era from which 
Brown writes where blacks have gained freedom while simultaneously losing it within the 
Southern regional morass of peonage, Jim Crow laws, and increasing violence against blacks.  
In other words, Brown produces, in My Southern Home, a theory of the contingency of 
identity by newly engaging the temporality and development of humans within a particular 
milieu from an era predisposed to view these possibilities as evolutionarily progressive both 
socio-culturally and biologically. Brown makes the tension between humans as specific 
identities versus humans as biological and cultural effects an emergent and developmental 
feature of the genre of African American autobiography.  
The reclassification of Brown’s identity into a Southern ethnicity begins with the 
landscape itself. Similar to notions of the dispersal and accumulation of human identity, 
Brown has invested serially in the Southern landscape, too. Unlike his first narrative, which 
falls within the genre of the slave narrative, Brown does not mention his birthplace or the 
“man who stole me as soon as I was born.”29 Instead, the text begins with a description of the 
land. Of note, however, is that Brown has used this description before. Below is the section 
taken from a chapter called “The Quadroon’s Home” in Clotel: 
ABOUT three miles from Richmond is a pleasant plain, with here and there a 
beautiful cottage surrounded by trees so as scarcely to be seen. Among them was one 
far retired from the public roads, and almost hidden among the trees. It was a perfect 
model of rural beauty. The piazzas that surrounded it were covered with clematis and 
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passion flower. The pride of China mixed its oriental looking foliage with the 
majestic magnolia, and the air was redolent with the fragrance of flowers, peeping out 
of every nook and nodding upon you with a most unexpected welcome. The tasteful 
hand of art had not learned to imitate the lavish beauty and harmonious disorder of 
nature, but they lived together in loving amity, and spoke in accordant tones. The 
gateway rose in a gothic arch, with graceful tracery in iron work, surmounted by a 
cross, round which fluttered and played the mountain fringe, that lightest and most 
fragile of vines. This cottage was hired by Horatio Green for Clotel, and the quadroon 
girl soon found herself in her new home. (64) 
The version of this paragraph in Clotel, however, is directly lifted, nearly word for word, 
from Maria Lydia Child’s short story “The Quadroons” written in 1842.30 While Brown, in 
the novel, is certainly mocking some of the conventions of Child’s work—he empowers 
Clotel in a manner that Child does not—my analysis relies on the shift in tone and content 
from Clotel to My Southern Home, and the fact that Brown once again pulls from a known of 
archive of self-referentiality to recontextualize both past and present.  
In My Southern Home, the section is rewritten as follows: 
TEN miles north of the city of St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, forty years 
ago, on a pleasant plain, sloping off toward a murmuring stream, stood a large frame-
house, two stories high; in front was a beautiful lake, and, in the rear, an old orchard 
filled with apple, peach, pear, and plum trees, with boughs untrimmed, all bearing 
indifferent fruit. The mansion was surrounded with piazzas, covered with grape-
vines, clematis, and passion flowers; the Pride of China mixed its oriental-looking 
foliage with the majestic magnolia, and the air was redolent with the fragrance of 
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buds peeping out of every nook, and nodding upon you with a most unexpected 
welcome.  
The tasteful hand of art, which shows itself in the grounds of European and 
New-England villas, was not seen there, but the lavish beauty and harmonious 
disorder of nature was permitted to take its own course, and exhibited a want of taste 
so commonly witnessed in the sunny South. (119) 
The re-use of the segment in My Southern Home accentuates the importance of landscape not 
simply by noting it as an opening gesture. Instead, the section describes a kind of degraded, 
lapsarian Eden with “an old orchard filled with apple, peach, pear, and plum trees, with 
boughs untrimmed, all bearing indifferent fruit.” The “lavish beauty and harmonious 
disorder” that seemed perhaps a positive element of the landscape in previous uses of this 
piece now suggests both a lack of control over the landscape by the people residing there 
along with the notion that the people themselves are both culturally and biologically to blame 
for the degradation. This is further emphasized by the “killing effects of the tobacco plant 
upon the lands of ‘Poplar Farm,’ [which was] seen in the rank growth of the brier, the thistle, 
the burdock, and the jimpson weed, showing themselves wherever the strong arm of the 
bondman had not kept them down” (120).  
The highlighting of landscape also matters in the serial sense of how Brown has 
always, in his works, accentuated place and the capacity for mobility. Stephen Lucasi refers 
to the post-slavery subjectivity that emerges from Brown’s very deliberate use of mobility 
“‘as a social resource’- an un(der)acknowledged material precondition for most literary 
production.”31 Lucasi notes that, even in his 1847 slave narrative, Brown takes an 
“unconventional first step”:  
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Brown notably omits from the Narrative any mention of his education in letters, a 
common element of the slave narrative genre that prominent 20th-century literary 
critics have touted as chief among the genre's concerns. Instead of depicting his 
literary education, and the links between that education and his desire for and success 
in flight from slavery, Brown reproduces the compulsory and fugitive travels of his 
youth and young adulthood. By foregoing the narration of literary acquisition in his 
first publication, Brown demonstrates the possibilities for freedom and agency 
outside of, or by routes other than, literacy.32 
The focus on human stasis and regional degradation in My Southern Home, then, is not a 
particularly new concern for Brown though the focus of inquiry has shifted. Instead of a 
narrative centered on mobility, Brown reflects upon the cost of immobility within a degraded 
landscape. 
Brown fosters the sense of human stasis and regional degradation by first placing 
himself in the position of a rational narrator, an abstract figure who appears infinitely smarter 
and more objective than anyone else in the text. William L. Andrews notes that Brown, 
within his own text, is “deindividualize[d],” that as an ambiguous narrator, he seems to pass 
as a “white southerner.”33 Andrews believes that this form of abstract passing empowers 
Brown, achieving a position of authority in the text that rhetorically surpasses Brown’s 
previous narratives. Such observations arise out of, one, Brown’s extremely judicious use of  
the word “I” in the text in reference to himself. Brown does not use “I” in reference to 
himself until page three, and then he uses “I” to comment, with great irony, on Dr. Gaines’s 
Christianity rather than report directly on himself: 
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For his Christian zeal, I had the greatest respect, for I always regarded him as a truly 
pious and conscientious man, willing at all times to give of his means the needful in 
spreading the Gospel. (3) 
Secondly, though Brown makes use of episodes from his life during slavery, he never refers 
to himself as a slave: 
While we had three or four trustworthy and faithful servants, it must be admitted that 
most of the negroes on ‘Poplar Farm’ were always glad to shirk labor, and thought 
that to deceive the whites was a religious duty…Both Dr. and Mrs. Gaines were 
easily deceived by their servants…Indeed, I often thought that Mrs. Gaines took 
peculiar pleasure in being misled by them…” (52-3) 
Third, as the above quotation also exemplifies, Brown places himself in a position of 
intimacy in connection with his owners Dr. and Mrs. Gaines, venturing both judgment and 
opinion in a manner that seems, perhaps, beyond what a slave would venture toward whites. 
Take, for example, the following sentence that refers to Mrs. Gaines: “I tried to comfort her 
by suggesting that the servants might get one ready in time…” (8). This example exhibits all 
three of the above points. One, he is witness to an encounter that disturbs Mrs. Gaines. Two, 
by referring to the servants in a manner that does not include himself, he seems positioned as 
outside the system of the slavery. Three, he offers comfort to a white woman.  
The ability to hold this position in the text, however, requires more than the rhetorical 
moves described above. The abstract and rational voice depends upon a counter narrative of 
his Southern self along with the devolution of everyone else, too. Everyone in the South 
devolves into types and objects, repetitive formations that do not attain the status of deeply 
individualized people. They, instead, cohere around a group identity that itself sinks into a 
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degraded landscape, allowing for the formation of a materiality that Brown can easily assert 
both a relation to and an observatory position above and outside of. This, in a sense, is Phillip 
Thurtle’s point concerning the formation of “genetic rationality” in the nineteenth century—
different approaches to information allow for new organizations of materiality and make 
certain kinds of engagements with rationality possible.34 While a portion of this work (as in 
Clotel) revolves around Brown’s reclassification of his own identity, it also depends upon his 
ability to very distinctly separate the components of everyone’s identity. This 
deindivualization allows for a form of annotation, a reorganization of social, cultural, and 
biological information on a larger scale of both time and region, and as such, reveals a 
different set of patterns as the text moves from personal narrative to a plea for emigration, 
and an appendix.  
One of the broadest ways in which Brown accomplishes this classification and 
separation is through the use of dialect. In his initial narrative, there is little to no use of 
dialect, and especially no use of dialect that represents Brown himself—like other authors of 
slave narratives, he clearly distinguishes himself as intelligent and literate. But the manner in 
which Brown resituates dialect in My Southern Home is important: while the use of dialect 
clearly separates his present construction of himself from his past, along with sometimes 
painting an excruciatingly ignorant betrayal of Southern blacks, he often positions the 
ignorance of blacks next to the ignorance of whites. Forms of speech, then, appear to reveal 
the ignorance of Southern blacks within the systematic and broader ignorance of whites, once 
again emphasizing a regional and systemic dysfunction. In fact, by placing the two groups 
repetitively side by side, rather than distinctly separate, the effects of actual speech and 
difference fade.  
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Chapter III is illustrative of this technique as Brown critiques the ignorance of the 
Gaines along with the resulting ignorance of their slave Cato. The chapter pays particular 
attention to the importance of location, in fact setting the scene and then emphasizing the 
repetitive quality of the interaction by moving from novelistic description to performative 
inscription. First, we hear dialogue from the Gaines, the owners of Poplar Farm: 
[The Doctor exclaims] “Well, my dear, my practice is steadily 
increasing….and I hope that the fever and ague, which is now taking hold of the 
people, will give me more patients. I see by the New Orleans papers that the yellow 
fever is raging there to a fearful extent….Men of my profession are reaping a harvest 
in that section this year. I would that we could have a touch of the yellow fever here, 
for I think I could invent a medicine that would cure it. But the yellow fever is a 
luxury that we medical men in this climate can’t expect to enjoy; yet we hope for the 
cholera.” 
“Yes,” replied Mrs. Gaines, “I would be glad to see it more sickly, so that 
your business might prosper. But we are always unfortunate….We must trust in the 
Lord. Providence may possibly send some disease amongst us for our benefit.” (138) 
In this dialogue, what is of note is that, as with slavery, the Gaines rely upon the misery of 
others to support their greed and lifestyle. They hope that the Southern regional morass of 
yellow fever and cholera will come to them in order to “[reap] a harvest”—something that 
the Gaines, as mediocre farmers of a mismanaged, slave-labored, and ravaged landscape are 
literally unable to do—and that it will come to them through a blessing from God. Brown 
quickly establishes a setting that is markedly Southern—a degraded landscape, enslavement, 
and a perverse form of religion bound by a repetitive cycle of greed, incapacity, and 
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ignorance. The repetitiveness of the cycle is further emphasized when Brown moves from 
novelistic dialogue to a more inscriptive performative style, as if to indicate that this type of 
interaction is deeply representative and repetitive: 
On going to the office the Doctor found the faithful servant hard at work, and 
saluting him in his usual kind and indulgent manner, asked, “Well, Cato, have made 
the batch of ointment that I ordered?” 
Cato. “Yes, massa; I dun made de intment, an’ now I is making the bread 
pills. De tater pills is up on the top shelf.” 
Dr. G. “I am going out to see some patients. If any gentlmen call, tell them I 
shall be in this afternoon. If any servants come, you attend to them. I expect two of 
Mr. Campbell’s boys over. You see to them. Feel their pulse, look at their tongues, 
bleed them, and give them each a does of calomel. Tell them to drink no cold water, 
and to take nothing but water gruel.” 
Cato. “Yes massa; I’ll tend to ’em.” 
The negro now said, “I allers knowed I was a doctor, an’ now de ole boss has 
put me at it; I muss change my coat. Ef any niggers comes, I wants to look 
suspectable. Dis jacket don’t suit a doctor; I’ll change it.” 
Cato’s vanity seemed at this point to be at its height, and having changed his 
coat, he walked up and down before the mirror, and viewed himself to his heart’s 
content, and saying to himself, “Ah! Now I looks like a doctor. Now I can bleed, pull 
teef, or cut off a leg….[Goes to the looking-glass and views himself.] I ’em some 
punkins, ain’t I? [Knock at the door.} Come in.” Enter Pete and Ned. 
Pete. “Whar is de Doctor?” 
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Cato. “Here I is; don’t you see me?”35 
What Brown reveals in this section is less the difference between Cato and Dr. Gaines and 
more of how regionally and institutionally alike they are. As Cato prepares the doctor’s 
“bread pills” and “tater pills,” and declares himself with a change of coat ready to “bleed, 
pull teef, or cut off a leg,” the only difference between him and the doctor is the stain of 
Southern white privilege. There is no account of where Dr. Gaines himself ever learned to 
become a doctor, and he certainly has no real skills. Thus, the two characters become less 
individuals and blend more into variants of each other, repetitive types made available by 
their setting.36  
Brown builds upon this notion of the devastating co-production of a Southern 
ethnicity between blacks and whites by first demonstrating the endemic ignorance and lack 
of culture by Southern whites. The principle forms of entertainment, which do not include 
shows “for want of sufficient patronage,” are “‘Gander Snatching,’” gambling by the men, 
and “snuff-dipping” by the women. In other words, the torture of animals and various forms 
of addiction in which fortunes are lost, duels are fought, and slaves sold to settle gambling 
debts. (160-164)  
Perhaps even worse, however, is the willful ignorance and apathy of whites where it 
not only seems that they exhibit a general lack of education and discernment but also, as 
Brown notes: “Dr. and Mrs. Gaines were easily deceived by their servants. Indeed, I often 
thought that Mrs. Gaines took peculiar pleasure in being misled by them; and even the 
Doctor, with his long experience and shrewdness, would allow himself to be carried off upon 
almost any pretext” (154).  Brown gives the example of Ike who makes off with the Doctor’s 
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boots, clothes, watch, and horse in order to attend a negro ball. Ike is not punished at all. 
Instead, the Doctor seems to take a great deal of pleasure in the lies that Ike tells: 
“Were any of the servants off the place last night?” inquired the Doctor, as Ike 
laid the clothes carefully on a chair, and was setting down the boots. 
 “No, I speck not,” answered Ike. 
 “Were you off anywhere last night?” asked the master. 
 “No sir,” replied the servant. 
 “What? Not off the place at all?” inquired the Doctor sharply. Ike looked 
confused and evidently began to “smell a mice.” 
 “Well, massa, I was not away only to step over to de prayer-meetin’ at de 
Corners, a little while, dats all,” said Ike. 
 “Where’s my watch?” asked the Doctor. 
 “I speck it’s on de mantle-shelf dar whar I put it lass night, sir” replied Ike, 
and at the same time reached to the time-piece, where he had laid it a moment before, 
and holding it up triumphantly, “Here it is, sir, right where I left it lass night.” 
 He was told to go which he was glad to do. (155) 
Ike is never punished. Ike’s “‘bad fix’” seems, instead, to hold value as entertainment for 
both blacks and whites, an alleviation of boredom in a region where “[p] rofitable and 
interesting entertainments were always needed” (160). 
While the Gaines promote a sense of mischief and ignorance amongst their slaves, 
they also, simultaneously, expect them, against all odds, to be smarter, too. The Gaines return 
from a visit North where “traveling for pleasure and seeking information upon the mode of 
agriculture in the free States, [they] returned home filled with new ideas which they were 
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anxious to put into immediate execution, and, therefore, a radical change was at once 
commenced.” The irony is that they expect the radical change to be enacted by the very 
people they enslave and hold illiterate. Thus, the men who must use the new plow soon dub it 
the “‘Yankee Dodger’” and it is soon broken. (150) 
The trials concerning the new “washing-machine,” however, “threw the novelty of 
the plow entirely in the shade” (150). Since the Gaines have no idea how to work the 
machine themselves, the slave Dolly states with ironic amusement, “An’ so dat tub wit its 
wheels an’ fixin’ is to do de washin’ while we’s to set down an’ look at it” (150). Eventually, 
Dolly takes the initiative to work with the machine: 
When [Mrs. Gaines] arose on Monday morning…instead of finding the 
washing out on the lines, she saw, to her great disappointment, the inside works of the 
“washer” taken out, and Dolly, the chief laundress, washing away with all of her 
power, in the old way, rubbing with her hands, the perspiration pouring down her 
black face. 
“What have been doing, Dolly, with the ‘washer?’” exclaimed the mistress, as 
she threw up her hands in astonishment. 
“Well, you see, missis,” said the servant, “dat merchine won’t work no way. I 
tried it one way, den I tried it an udder way, an’ still it would not work. So, you see, I 
got de screw-driver an’ I took it to pieces. Dat’s de reason I ain’t go along faster wid 
de work.” 
Mrs. Gaines returned to the parlor, sat down, and had a good cry, declaring 
her belief that “negroes could not be made white folks, no matter what you should do 
with them.” (151) 
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The irony is, of course, that Southern whites cannot be “made white folks” either. Again, as 
with the association between Cato and the Doctor discussed earlier, Brown suggests the 
development of a Southern niche culture in which humans become increasingly simplistic 
and degraded. Mrs. Gaines and Dolly are less individuals and are instead mired in a Southern 
ethnicity arising out of the regional and institutional effects of living in the South within the 
system of slavery, a devolution into region and landscape, and into each other. There is no 
narrative of progress. There is actually more of a sense of the unmaking of humans in, as 
John Ernst has noted concerning the South in My Southern Home, “a sort of perfect storm of 
regional, racial, and class tensions, resulting in a destructive force that is all too 
predictable.”37 With unsparing irony, Brown describes the relationship between blacks and 
whites in the following manner: “Slavery has had the effect of brightening the mental powers 
of the negro to a certain extent, especially those brought into close contact with whites” 
(137).  The brightening effect is that, early in the text, most everyone devolves into comic 
ignorance, but as the book progresses, Brown comes to describe whites as a “shoddy, 
ignorant, superstitious, rebellious, and negro-hating population ” (291) that through “brute 
force” has completely subdued his race (233).  Blacks, however, fair no better: 
WHILE the “peculiar institution” was a great injury to both master and slaves, yet 
there was considerable truth in the oft-repeated saying that the slave “was happy.” It 
was indeed, a low kind of happiness, existing only where masters were disposed to 
treat their servants kindly, and where the proverbial light-heartedness of the latter 
prevailed. History shows that of all races, the African was best adapted to be the 
“hewers of wood, and drawers of water.”  
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John Ernest, one of the central critics of My Southern Home, believes that William 
Wells Brown, through the “push and pull” of Southern forces  “becomes the southern home 
he seeks.”38 I couldn’t disagree more. From the comic to the cynical portrayal of ignorance, 
from the taking on of all the factors of Southern posturing and prejudice, it seems more likely 
that Brown, in his final text, finally situates the South as a particular developmental niche, a 
site of biological and cultural repetition that counters most popular renditions of evolutionary 
theory and narratives of progress that dominate the American scene at this time often at the 
expense of African Americans. Biological and cultural repetition moves the self in the South 
not toward individual and racial progress but toward a Southern ethnicity and a regional 
degradation that creates a lazy, ignorant, and violent variant of American culture, a variant 
that, in fact, is equal to its milieu. Brown captures the cycle of devolution, the movement of 
individuals toward ethnicity and repetitive types. He also makes this tension between humans 
as specific identities versus humans as biological and cultural effects an emergent and 
developmental feature of the genre of African American autobiography, a methodology that 
allows him to comment upon the effects of the past and present simultaneously. By Chapter 
XVI, the autobiography markedly shifts in tone. Brown the cynic, the provocateur, pulls 
blacks out of the ashes of Southern nonidentity: work, education, professionalism. His 
rallying cry? “Black men, emigrate” (292). 
In the chapter that follows, Mark Twain, like Brown, engages with the dynamics of 
the seriality of identity. Twain, however, looks to the technological innovation of 
fingerprinting to create a system and medium to classify and secure particular forms of 
identity and memory leading to the reassertion of racial values inherent in systems of science 
and technology, law, commerce, and reproduction. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Innovation and Stasis, Technology and Race in Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson1 
 
 
“This is a familiar dilemma in [Twain’s] work generally which frequently ends, as 
does Pudd’nhead Wilson, in a stalemate between radical criticism and an implicit 
conservatism expressed in the refusal or the inability, when it comes to it, to imagine 
significant change.  The stalemate here seems particularly frustrating: change must be 
defeated, yet nothing of the established way of life appears worth preserving.” 
Myra Jehlen, "The Ties that Bind: Race and Sex in Pudd'nhead Wilson," (1990).2  
 
Mark Twain’s novel Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894)3 seems calculated to produce the 
effect, as Myra Jehlen notes above, of a “particularly frustrating” opaqueness. Although 
Jehlen accuses Twain of leaving readers at an impasse, other critics find Pudd’nhead Wilson 
emblematic of either “radical criticism” or “implicit conservatism”; seemingly a text for all 
seasons, Pudd’nhead Wilson is sharply coherent or poorly written, innately racist or 
inherently racially progressive, essentially about nature or essentially about nurture.4 Such 
divergent readings, however, do cohere around Twain’s known interest in representations of 
technology and identity. This essay argues that, by exploiting the “hypermediacy” between 
bodies and technologies,5 Twain’s novel demonstrates how the proliferation of technologies 
of identification, such as fingerprinting, attempt to counter how bodies evolve beyond 
previous constraints, in particular the constraints of racial classification. Twain develops an 
account of subjectivity and racial classification that often seems highly constrained, yet the 
organization of subjects within the novel covers an extraordinary breadth of genealogy, 
biology, and law, while still invoking elements of randomness and chance.   
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The key to such combinations of the fixity and emergence of human identity in 
Pudd’nhead Wilson is the specific material marker—the technology of fingerprinting—that 
comes to be the final marker of identity in this novel.6 The selling of what Kaushik S. Rajan 
refers to as “human biologicals,” the growth of genomic capital through the development of 
human cell lines, may seem distantly related to Twain’s use of the archiving of fingerprints; 
the distance, however, reflects when the different sites of biological access were developed 
and not the paradigm of categorization behind each effort.7 In other words, the desires that 
organize biological and technological identification, classification, and marketability, from 
the era of slavery to the era of human genomics, often rely on similar notions of race and 
reproduction that attempt to counter, or overcome, what Sarah Franklin refers to as the 
“unexpected liveliness of the [biological] objects themselves.”8    
Additionally important is that an analysis of nineteenth-century fingerprinting in 
Pudd’nhead Wilson not only explores how technologies organize race and gender, but also 
how technologies organize each other. Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin suggest that “the 
fascination with media also has a history as a representational practice and a cultural logic.” 
It is worth noting, then, not only the position of “hypermediacy” that fingerprinting takes on 
in relation to organizations of race and reproduction in this novel, but also how such relations 
intermediate among other technologies such as calendars and, most importantly, technologies 
of narrative.9 Fingerprinting, then, is not simply a “[fact] of literature” within Pudd’nhead 
Wilson; instead, fingerprinting becomes, as genre theorist Yury Tyanov notes, a “literary 
[fact],” an element of genre development that allows Twain to particularly frame 
biotechnological and representational practices, and leads toward a Bakhtinian sense of the 
“novelization” of biology and training in this text.10   
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Mikhail Bakhtin describes the novel as “the only developing genre and therefore it 
reflects more deeply, more essentially, more sensitively and rapidly, reality itself in the 
process of its unfolding. Only that which is itself developing can comprehend development 
as a process.”11 The notion of the comprehension of development as a process is, in and of 
itself, an important element to consider given Twain’s interest in the development, or lack of, 
in man.12 The impact of the use of technologies such as fingerprinting within Pudd’nhead 
Wilson cannot be understood without a more fundamental analysis of Twain’s understanding 
of biology and training, and how it then follows that technology and bodies become so 
deeply enmeshed. Fingerprinting, for Twain, is a matter of fact, a system and a medium that 
objectifies identity. Additionally, however, fingerprinting is both speculative and a spectacle; 
it is, as Bruno Latour asserts, a “gathering” where fingerprinting is both “an object out there 
[and] an issue very much in there.”13 Twain’s speculative engagement with the technology of 
fingerprinting creates a system and medium to classify and secure particular forms of identity 
and memory leading to the reassertion of racial values inherent in systems of science and 
technology, law, commerce, and reproduction.  
 
Pudd’nhead Wilson’s Calendar: A Reflection on Irony and Ethical Indeterminacy  
 
The calendar, a term used interchangeably with the term almanac,14 was as The 
American Antiquarian Society states, the most widely available and universally owned book, 
and was counted as “indispensable” by both farmers and professionals:  
The almanac had an essential place in homes where no other form of literature 
entered and where, often, not even the Bible and the newspaper were found. If the 
almanac had a comprehensive subject, it was: How to get through life. The otherwise 
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dissociated miscellany it contained was indeed rather like that forming the contents of 
a person's mind as he gets through life each day. Not only an anthology of daily life 
but a preview of its entire visible cosmic setting through the coming cycle of months 
was to be found in this stitched-up pamphlet of soft paper.15 
The use of the calendar by Twain, then, frames the narrative in a particular manner. Twain 
qualifies the negative public reaction to Pudd’nhead Wilson’s calendar entries by stating that 
“irony was not for those people; their mental vision was not focused for it. They read those 
playful trifles in the solidest earnest.”16 Calendars, however, were “earnest” documents 
explicitly developed as techniques not only for “[getting] through life each day,” but 
additionally as descriptions of life’s “entire visible cosmic setting.”  
Such elements are enunciated in the first calendar entry where the tensions between 
the everyday accounting of time come into conflict with notions of character:   
There is no character, howsoever good and fine, but it can be destroyed by ridicule, 
howsoever poor and witless. Observe the ass, for instance: his character is about 
perfect, he is the choicest spirit among all the humbler animals, yet see what ridicule 
has brought him to. Instead of feeling complimented when we are called an ass, we 
are left in doubt. (1) 
Cathy Boeckmann notes that the word “character” referred, in the late nineteenth century, “to 
a quantifiable set of inherited behaviors and tendencies that were almost always racial,” 
rather than our contemporary figurative usage that implies “the imagined structure of an 
individual’s moral and ethical orientations.”17 Twain, however, seems to play with the notion 
of character in both senses of our understanding of the term: the ass has attained perfection 
over the long course of time, yet ridicule, the emotional or affectual relation of the ass to 
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other creatures and things, has “destroyed” him. The entry serves as an initial comic volley 
toward the destabilization of multiple registers of character and individual identity, skirting 
along the edges of, and conflating, biology, affect, and race. The calendar, then, rather than 
simply adding ironic content to the beginning of each chapter, comments more broadly upon 
the thematic structure of the novel. 
One of the most frequently cited calendar entries comments upon such structure by 
ambiguously referencing biology and training: “Training is everything. The peach was once a 
bitter almond; cauliflower is nothing but cabbage with a college education” (23). Although 
this entry seems well-suited as an illustration of Twain’s emphasis on the social and cultural, 
rather than biological, aspects of human development, such an analysis of the entry only 
leads to further confusion about Twain’s understanding of the melding of culture and 
biology. I argue that the calendar entry uneasily points to a sense of all matter as inert mind, 
or mind simply as inert matter: such matter—fruits, vegetables, perhaps even man—are 
capable of being educated. Training, in this sense, invokes biology and variation—the 
processes of artificial selection reflect, at the very least, a multi-generational heft that would 
allow cabbage, by chance, to speciate into cauliflower. Yet, the bitter almond of the peach 
seed does not simply over time become fruit—it must be planted and nurtured in order to 
become anything at all: still, it can only become a peach. The entry takes on the full scope of 
Twain’s comic, and cosmic, irony—you can only become, through education, what you 
are—at the same time, you may become something entirely new!   
Most important in this regard, however, is the calendar entry in the final chapter: 
“October 12, the Discovery. It was wonderful to find America, but it would have been more 
wonderful to miss it” (113). Susan Gillman notes the irony of this entry by stating that “[f]or 
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a murder mystery, in which the murderer’s identity has been known from the very beginning, 
to close with a problematic discovery is to confirm the earlier hint that how we know has 
replaced what we know as the object of inquiry.18 Twain’s ironical portraiture of “how we 
know” only becomes fully operational, however, when the “author” of the calendar, David 
Wilson, is considered as the underlying structure or device that exists in relation with the 
calendar. Not only does Wilson’s use of the genre of the calendar itself emphasize a shift 
from (in Gillman’s terms) what we know to how we know, but the affiliation between Wilson 
and the technologies he employs is important, as the relationship stresses the hypermediacy 
between bodies and technologies. Such hypermediacy is not only structured upon the 
character of Wilson; it is also enacted by Wilson. In other words, Wilson himself operates as 
a technology that initiates other levels of hypermediacy between bodies and technologies in 
the novel. The accompanying calendar entry of this chapter is important in this regard: “It is 
often the case that the man who can’t tell a lie thinks he is the best judge of one” (113).   
Wilson is the character who does not lie in the novel, yet he is bizarrely removed 
from the ethical consequences of the text. Although the calendar both structures and 
complicates everyday understandings of life, time, and the cosmos, it is Wilson as the author 
of the calendar, as the initiator of an archive of fingerprinting, and his subsequent use of that 
archive in relation to racial classification that reveals the deeper machinations of Twain’s 
novelization of biology and training.   
 
Action and Reaction, Technology and Ethics  
To analyze Wilson as a technology is to address what characterization means within 
the novel as a whole. Authors differently stress the importance of character formation and 
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action. In the case of Pudd’nhead Wilson, Twain accentuates action through event—the 
switching of the babies, murder, the spectacle of the trial—which gives the initial impression 
that he is less interested in character development. The literary critic Richard Chase, for 
example, notes that “the moral truth [the novel] asserts is not adequately attached to the 
characters, or dramatized by them.”19 Twain’s comprehension of the relationships among 
technology, biology, and training, however, reveal that he instead understands the process of 
human development as action: for Twain, humans function as active and reactive entities—
character development and event, then, are nearly equivalent. In other words, the model of 
character development in Pudd’nhead Wilson reflects Twain’s belief in people as they exist 
in the world.   
Twain expresses the equivalency between action and personal development in his 
essay “What is Man?,” published in 1906 but worked on as early as 1880. In the essay, for 
example, Twain discusses how humans can change their behavior through the  
value of TRAINING IN RIGHT DIRECTIONS OVER TRAINING IN WRONG 
ONES… .He has only to change his habitat--his ASSOCIATIONS.  But the impulse 
to do it must come from the OUTSIDE--he cannot originate it himself, with that 
purpose in view. Sometimes a very small and accidental thing can furnish him the 
initiatory impulse and start him on a new road, with a new idea. The chance remark of 
a sweetheart….The accident of a broken leg….The chance reading of a book or of a 
paragraph in a newspaper can start a man on a new track and make him renounce his 
old associations and seek new ones that are IN SYMPATHY WITH HIS NEW 
IDEAL: and the result, for that man, can be an entire change of his way of life.20  
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Individual identity, then, is established through action and events concerning objects outside 
of the self along with technological constraints.   
The notion of technology as constraining, given Twain’s great interest in 
technological and scientific advancement, seems paradoxical. Fingerprinting, however, like 
the development of humans themselves, simply confirms the unique and the deterministic, 
the innovative and the static. Just as many theorists today express an interest in “code” as the 
basis of not only computerized technology but also human cognition,21 Twain uses 
fingerprinting as the spectacular revelation of something entirely new—still it can only reveal 
who we already are.    
Most importantly, Twain views humans themselves as both spectacular revelation and 
statically determined: “Man the machine--man the impersonal engine. Whatsoever a man is, 
is due to his MAKE, and to the INFLUENCES brought to bear upon it by his heredities, his 
habitat, his associations.”22 For Twain, then, a character such as Wilson exists as an effect, 
and though critics have resisted Twain’s own account of Wilson as a “piece of machinery,”23 
such a description is crucially important, reflecting not only Twain’s view of humans but also 
pointing toward what Derek Parker Royal refers to as the “ethical indeterminacy” of such 
characters.24   
Although Twain initially presents Wilson as having “an intelligent blue eye that had 
frankness and comeradeship [sic] in it” (5), he changes within a quarter page to someone the 
locals find visibly incomprehensible due to the following exchange that Wilson initiates 
when he hears a howling dog: 
“I wish I owned half of that dog.” 
“Why?” someone asked. 
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“Because, I would kill my half.” 
The group searched his face with curiosity, with anxiety even, but found no 
light there, no expression that they could read. They fell away from him as from 
something uncanny. (5) 
What is surprising about this exchange is not so much Twain’s ridicule of the reasoning of 
the locals as they attempt to analyze Wilson’s comments, but the duplicity of Wilson himself. 
As a random member of the community, having “wandered to this remote region” (5), 
Wilson’s sudden move from frankness to opacity highlights Royal’s observation of Wilson’s 
“artful performance and ethical indeterminacy.”25   
 
Whiteness and Speculation 
Although Wilson exemplifies the combination of questionable authority and 
performance, such qualities are present in many of the characters and set the conditions that 
particularly highlight how the technology of fingerprinting must rise to finally constrain 
racial and class identity when the technologies of whiteness fail. The most noticeable of such 
traits is how many of the characters engage with elements of risk and speculation. The 
significance of speculation in the text not only reinforces Twain’s understanding of training 
and character development as a product of action and reaction that comes from the 
“OUTSIDE” of man; the elements of risk and speculation also lead my textual analysis away 
from an overly hasty analysis of only the “black” characters in the novel. After all, such traits 
are first structured around the moral and reproductive incapacitation of the Driscolls. 
Although Twain’s novel may seem structured around conceptions of slavery or the 
organization of the black body, it is instead the descriptions of the dysfunctional bodies of the 
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most elite citizens in town, those who claim to trace their heritage back to the First Families 
of Virginia, or F.F.V.s, that follow the first calendar entry. At first glance, the description 
reveals the inability, or the disinclination, of the F.F.V.s to biologically reproduce. Judge 
Driscoll and his wife are, unhappily, childless. The judge’s widowed sister is also childless. 
The attorney Pembroke Howard is a bachelor. Percy Driscoll and his wife, brother and sister-
in-law to the judge, have children, but they are sickly, and one after another die. In other 
words, the F.F.V.s seem reproductively unfit and doomed to extinction.   
Additionally, the F.F.V.s are morally reckless. Percy Driscoll contributes to the death 
of his children through his “antediluvian methods” of doctoring them (5), and by the time of 
his death, his absorption in speculation costs him his fortune leaving his only son a “pauper” 
(22). A “fairly humane man, toward slaves and other animals” (9), his (self-defined) high 
moment of morality comes when he sells three of his slaves locally for stealing a small sum 
of money rather than selling them “DOWN THE RIVER” (12). F.F.V. Colonel Cecil 
Burleigh Essex, “another F.F.V. of formidable calibre [sic]” (4), is the father of Tom, thus 
highlighting the sexual activity between F.F.V.s and slaves. Even Judge Driscoll, put forward 
as “fine, and just, and generous” (4) is, by the novel’s conclusion, bribing voters and calling 
the Italian twins “dime-museum freaks” (17).   
The loose analysis of Darwinian unfitness and extinction falls short, however, due to 
the presence of the slave Roxana whose phenotype reflects a long history of sexual relations 
and successful reproduction between F.F.V.s and their slaves. In fact, since Roxy is only 
“one-sixteenth” black, there is essentially no biological difference between her and the 
F.F.V.s. To even imagine a woman of supposedly pure African blood requires looking back 
to at least her great-great grandmother, and Roxy herself takes the claim back even further:  
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“My great-great-great-gran’father…was ole Cap’n John Smith, de highes’ blood dat Ole 
Virginny ever turned out; en his great-great-gran’mother or somers along back dah, was 
Pocahontas de Injun queen, en her husbun’ was a nigger king outen Africa.” (70) Twain may 
present Roxy’s history as humorous, but even within the humor there is an insistence on a 
genealogy that places Roxy’s ancestors within colonial America at the same moment as the 
paternally ordered origins of the Driscolls. Most importantly, however, Roxy’s narrative of 
descent, suggesting an amalgamation with families such as the Driscolls, implies that such 
families themselves are not “white,” that they already, at the very origin of America, and 
even generations before, are a random mix of European, Indian, and African blood.   
Roxy, then, exhibits the overall instability of racial categorization where whiteness is 
a legal and commercial venture that exists in contrast to the mixed racial biology of all the 
characters in the novel. Of additional importance is how such a venture exists in contrast to 
(while becoming conflated with) the narrative burden of genealogy and racial taxonomy that 
Roxy bears for the majority of the novel. Roxy understands that her child is the biological 
equal of the Driscoll’s child. She simply needs to consider what will allow her child to be 
classified as white. As she discovers, it is initially simply a matter of changing clothes, 
placing her baby “in one of Thomas à Becket’s snowy long baby-gowns with its bright blue 
bows and dainty flummery of ruffles” (14). Roxy herself experiences “astonishment” when 
she initially witnesses the transformation affected by simply placing her son in the “dainty 
flummery” of whiteness while simultaneously dressing the white child in the “towlinen shirt” 
of blackness (14). She states, “Now who would b’lieve clo’es could do de like o’ dat?  Dog 
my cats if it ain’t all I kin do to tell t’other fum which, let alone his pappy” (14). Later, 
through an additional regime of diet and discipline, Tom becomes white: 
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 Tom got all the petting, Chambers got none. Tom got all the delicacies, Chambers 
got mush and milk, and clabber without sugar. In consequence, Tom was a sickly 
child and Chambers wasn’t. Tom was ‘fractious,’ as Roxy called it, and overbearing, 
Chambers was meek and docile….Chambers was strong beyond his years, and a good 
fighter; strong because he was coarsely fed and hard worked about the house, and a 
good fighter because Tom furnished him plenty of practice—on white boys whom he 
hated and was afraid of….He fought himself into such a formidable reputation, by 
and by, that Tom could have changed clothes with him, and “ridden in peace,” like 
Sir Kay in Launcelot’s armor. (18-19)  
The reference to the change of clothes at the end of the quotation is important: not 
only does the allusion stress the continued physical resemblance of the boys, but it also 
underscores the original site of the boys’ training—the chance changing of their clothes as 
infants. Such references exemplify the movement of the biological into the cultural. Food and 
clothing are physical necessities, but Twain, significantly, presents food and clothing first as 
cultural accoutrements. Such trappings, however, become biologically ensnaring as Tom 
becomes physically, and morally, weak while Chambers becomes physically strong and 
morally docile. Roxy herself becomes physically transformed by “the fiction”:  “she forgot 
who she was and what [her son] had been” as the deception “concreted itself into 
habit…[becoming] automatic and unconscious” (19).    
Most importantly, the biological and cultural entrapments described above reveal the 
hazards of racial division. Like the economic activities of Percy Driscoll, and the sexual 
activities of Cecil Burleigh Essex, the concept of whiteness is increasingly associated with 
speculation and risk. Rather than simply a story of white dominion, then, or a tragic tale of 
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passing, Pudd’nhead Wilson reveals that whiteness has become as technically complicated as 
blackness, requiring both techniques and technology not only to support and define it, but 
also as a corrective when individuals such as Roxy reveal their understanding of it. Indeed, 
though Roxy’s exchange of the babies is important in that the action unveils the biological 
equality of the boys, of equal importance to consider is that the action also parallels the risky 
speculative environment of the family who owns her. Immediately after the exchange of 
babies, “one of [Mr. Percy’s] speculations was in jeopardy….Within a few days the fate of 
the speculation became so dubious that Mr. Percy went away with his brother the Judge to 
see what could be done about it” (16). There is a double irony within this quotation: while 
Percy Driscoll worries about a land deal gone awry, his speculation in human property at 
home is jeopardized by one of the investments itself. Roxy, as both investment and investor, 
demonstrates that the exchange of the babies isn’t simply impulsive—the transaction partakes 
of the speculative environment of the slave trade and F.F.V. investment strategy. In fact, as 
the novel progresses, the element of speculative risk and violence engaged in by Roxy and 
Tom, who because of miscegenation, represent both F.F.V. and black subjectivity, escalates 
and comes to significantly mark not only how race is organized within the novel, but 
accentuates how the technology of fingerprinting emerges as a racial and fiscal constraint in 
the final chapters of the novel.   
Roxy herself takes on an initial element of risk by speculating in the future of two 
children where her own son becomes white while the true heir is now at risk of being sold 
down the river. As Roxy says, “I’s sorry for you, honey; I’s sorry, Gods knows I is,—but 
what kin I do, what could I do? Yo’ pappy would sell him to somebody some time, en den 
he’d go down de river, sho’, en I couldn’t,  couldn’t, couldn’t stan’ it” (15). Such 
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protestations invoking the love of a mother for her child, however, shift as she is forced, after 
a bank crashes and she loses her life savings, to increasingly regard her son’s position as 
white as an economic investment that she must protect.26 In fact, in order to safeguard such 
an investment in whiteness, Roxy must, paradoxically, ensure that Tom identifies himself as 
black.   
This process, where Tom becomes black, illustrates the conflation of the economic 
venture of whiteness and Roxy’s narrative burden of genealogy and racial taxonomy 
discussed earlier. For example, in two crucial moments of twist and counter-twist, Roxy first 
describes her son at the moment of racial revelation as the “Fine nice young white gen’lman 
kneelin’ down to a nigger wench! I’s wanted to see dat jes’ once befor’b I’s called” (38-40). 
Later, however, in a moment of scathing denunciation, she states, “It’s de nigger in you, dat’s 
what it is. Thirty-one parts o’ you is white, en on’y one part nigger, en dat po’ little one part 
is yo’ soul” (70). Roxy declares, first, that her son remains white, in spite of what she will 
soon reveal to him about his true heritage. Later, she declares her son black in spite of a 
genealogy and training that should instead confirm his whiteness. In other words, Roxy’s 
variable reactions to Tom lay bare the consequences of a belief in biological (and the 
resulting cultural) determinism: under such ideology, ethical development arises by chance, 
and, as I noted from Richard Chase above, “moral truth” is detached from characterization, 
residing within action and reaction (rather than in any strong sense of individuality), 
developing by chance and accident—which, crucially, are really the defining qualities of 
Twain’s version of training. As such, systems of ethics require extraordinary and increasingly 
innovative techniques to maintain them. These techniques, such as fingerprinting, come to be 
the final markers of identity while inflicting fatal damage upon individuality.  
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Prints, the Archive, and “imitation white”  
“Every human being carries with him from his cradle to his grave certain physical 
marks which do not change their character, and by which he can always be 
identified—and that without shade of doubt or question. These marks are his 
signature, his physiological autograph, so to speak, and this autograph cannot be 
counterfeited, nor can he disguise it or hide it away, nor can it become illegible by the 
wear and the mutations of time…this signature is each man’s very own—there is not 
duplicate of it among the swarming populations of the globe!” 
David Wilson in Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson (108). 
 
In a twenty-first century text, a quote such as the one above might refer to the human 
genome contained in every cell of our bodies and easily obtained from blood, saliva, or a 
swab of tissue taken from the inside cheek of the mouth. Instead, this quotation reveals Mark 
Twain’s deep pleasure in the nineteenth century archiving of fingerprints. Such pleasure is 
displayed in the centrality of David Wilson’s movement from print avocationist to courtroom 
expert, his twenty years worth of archival work coming to fruition in identifying Tom as the 
murderer of Judge York Driscoll. It is important to remember, however, that nowhere in the 
United States, or even internationally, had fingerprints been used as forensic evidence in a 
trial. In fact, there was much debate about the best use of fingerprints across the latter half of 
the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.27   
Figures such as Francis Galton (Charles Darwin’s half cousin and the founder of 
eugenics) hoped to find hereditary markers within the patterned ridges, whorls, and arches of 
the fingers: he was repeatedly disappointed by the individual uniqueness of fingerprints and 
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his inability to find evidence suggesting that fingerprint patterns were heritable. He not only 
hoped to use fingerprinting to identify individuals but to identify groups by class and race. 
Galton additionally believed that such evidence would prove that certain groups were less 
evolved—for example, “undesirables” such as savages and criminals.28 The failure of such 
research tended to put Galton and others like him on the defensive: their ideas seemed to 
smack of palmistry.29   
Those interested in the uniqueness of prints distanced themselves from the work of 
researchers such as Francis Galton. Convinced of the potential of fingerprinting as a 
technology and medium well-suited to the purposes of identification, they were instead 
concerned with how to classify such individuality, how to textualize tens of thousands of 
prints, and how to convince bureaucrats that fingerprinting was a more valuable technique 
and system of classification than anthropometry, a system developed by Alphonse Bertillon 
in France in the nineteenth century that came to be used internationally. Those interested in 
fingerprinting believed they had found an objective method of identification that countered 
the faults of other systems.30   
Yet, it is interesting to observe what is involved in marking such objectivity. Even 
before Wilson’s dramatic courtroom revelations, Roxy once refers in anger to Chambers as 
an “imitation nigger” (35). He then refers to both of them as “imitation white” stating that 
“we don’t amount to noth’n as imitation niggers” (35, author’s emphasis). This position is 
echoed pages later as Tom reflects upon his newly revealed status as a “nigger.” He finds that 
“the habit of a lifetime had in some mysterious way vanished….It was the ‘nigger’ in him 
asserting its humility…giving the road…shrinking and skulking here and there and yonder, 
and fancying it saw suspicion and maybe detection in all faces, tones, and gestures” (44-45). 
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In other words, Chambers and Tom have both become “imitation white”—Chambers as the 
white slave, Tom as the black heir. As Roxy states of her relationship with Tom when she 
reveals to him that he is her son, “She couldn’t love him, as yet, because there ‘warn’t 
nothing to him’” (46). Later, after Wilson reveals the true identity of Tom and Chambers in 
the setting of the murder trial, they each become imitation heir and imitation slave, 
illustrating that, racially, there is nothing to anyone.   
Tom particularly exemplifies this position: as the novel moves forward, there is less 
and less to Tom—he spirals down from heir to slave, from murderer to “erroneous 
inventory” (115)—and Wilson brings such matters into dramatic display within the 
courtroom. First, Wilson is able to accurately identify the fingerprints of several volunteers 
from the courtroom. As he has collected then studied the prints of most everyone in 
Dawson’s Landing for twenty years, he has no trouble associating each print with its maker: 
“This is the signature of Mr. Justice Robinson.” [Applause]  “This, of Constable Blake.” 
[Applause] “This of the sheriff.” [Applause]  “I cannot name the others, but I have them all at 
home, named and dated, and could identify them all by my finger-print records.” (110). 
As Wilson then moves his analysis of fingerprints from the volunteers’ self-made 
marks to the “pantograph enlargements” (105) scrutinized by the jury and courtroom 
audience, he creates a lasting sensation that forever changes how the observers of the trial 
view a portion of their anatomy. The pantographs, even more than the original prints, 
presents a sampling of the self that displays how such archives exist as both continuous and 
discontinuous with the bodies from which they originate.31 The fingerprints of Tom and 
Chambers directly represent who Wilson claims they biologically are, even to the point that 
each print contains hair oil and skin cells from across the lives of the two men. Most 
 	  68 
importantly, however, the prints also exist as a separate archive controlled by Wilson—as the 
only “expert,” Wilson monitors not only what goes into the archive but also how its contents 
come to be analyzed and used. Such speculative use of forensic evidence by Twain foretells 
of the particular methods and settings that came to be utilized around other technologies of 
identification and biological samples across the twentieth century.   
Of additional importance is how courtroom forensics in Pudd’nhead Wilson 
undermine the visual aspects of racial identification: the visual becomes at once 
untrustworthy, newly defined, and evidentiary, while looping back to support the very details 
that undermined the visual in the first place. Most telling in this respect is the moment when 
Wilson directly accuses Tom:   
“Valet de Chambre, negro and slave—falsely called Thomas á Becket 
Driscoll—make upon the window the finger-prints that will hang you!” 
Tom turned his ashen face imploringly toward the speaker, made some 
impotent movements with his white lips, then slid limp and lifeless to the floor. 
      Wilson broke the awed silence with the words— 
      “There is no need. He has confessed.” (112-13) 
Tom, whiter than ever at the moment he “confesses,” with his “ashen face” and “white lips,” 
crucially does not provide the final proof actually required in a court of law: Wilson’s 
performance, his use of the archive rather than the fingerprint he asks for, reduces Tom to 
that of the “lifeless”—he is once again black and enslaved.   
The configuration of fingerprinting within a closed circle of interpretation guarantees 
such an outcome. Wilson not only shapes the collection of fingerprints but is also the sole 
interpreter of the data, which converts the murder of Judge Driscoll from a crime to a random 
 	  69 
event, and fingerprinting, from a remediation of the technologies of human identity to a sort 
of bar code transactor for commerce. Such use highlights the development of what is (from 
Twain’s time to the present day) the necessary relationship between economics and 
technologies of identity that Twain marks as the final absurdity of the text. Fingerprinting 
functions as the technology and medium through which specific human identities are 
confirmed and crimes solved, but such objectives easily conform to the stance of the 
creditors from the Percy Driscoll estate who come forward once they discover that Tom is 
actually a slave: “They rightly claimed that “Tom” was lawfully their property and had been 
so for eight years….if he had been delivered up to them in the first place, they would have 
sold him and he could not have murdered Judge Driscoll, therefore it was not he that had 
really committed the murder, the guilt lay with the erroneous inventory” (115). The 
technological identification of Tom as a specific human is the very event that leads to his 
devolution, to his reduction from that of a subject to a saleable piece of inventory.   
Ironically, there is little to identify Chambers as a subject either once he is identified 
as white. Positioned at the end of the novel, Twain devotes a paragraph to “the real heir” 
stating that his “long story” cannot be followed (114). The long story of Chambers cannot be 
followed for reasons similar to the silence surrounding the inconsequential Colonel Cecil 
Burleigh Essex at the beginning of the novel. If an account of sexual relations between 
F.F.V.s and slaves is prohibited, the conversion of a white slave into F.F.V. aristocracy is 
equally prohibitive. Instead of illustrating the successful reinstatement of identity, the 
propelling of Chambers into a white identity only serves to illustrate the tenuousness of racial 
classification to begin with. 
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The story of a white “nigger” can be told by Twain if that person becomes black, as in 
the tale of Tom. The reorganization of Tom as black propels him into easy relations with his 
dead master’s estate, supporting the legal and commercial venture of whiteness. Additionally, 
he becomes impersonal: Tom, suddenly, was never a person. Twain’s use of the pardon from 
the governor affirms this as Tom is stripped of subjectivity: “Everybody saw that there was 
reason in this” and “the creditors sold him down the river” (115). The irony of situating the 
word “reason” against the absurdity of racial subject/object positions is comically 
emphasized by the word “everybody,” for clearly, everybody only refers to those categorized 
as white.   
In contrast, the story of the culturally black Chambers inhabiting the role of the free 
white heir requires a description of a black object (a slave) abruptly processed into white 
subjectivity. In other words, Chambers does not, suddenly, become a person. Remarkably, 
Twain posits no human relations for Chambers once he becomes white. Instead, Twain refers 
to his relationship with other objects and spaces: “The poor fellow could not endure the 
terrors of the white man’s parlor, and felt at home and at peace nowhere but in the kitchen. 
The family pew was a misery to him, yet he could nevermore enter into the solacing refuge 
of the “nigger gallery”—that was closed to him for good and all” (114). Chambers is never 
fully individualized; he remains an effect and an especially dangerous one for Twain to dwell 
on: a man who is culturally black is now a leading citizen of Dawson’s Landing. 
Additionally, Chambers is the final production of the F.F.V.s. The return of the heir (a potent 
reference in light of F.F.V. obsession with aristocratic codes of honor), instead of 
augmenting the stability of white culture, calls into question the very deterministic attributes 
that visually, and culturally, define whiteness. 
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Fingerprinting, then, represents the direction that technologies of identity would seek 
to employ—a movement away from direct visual observation of bodies, whose emergence 
and change over time makes them difficult to categorize, to reliance on archives of 
information that become increasingly removed from the contexts of meaning and emergence 
those bodies inhabit. Yet, the final of irony of Pudd’nhead Wilson is that the archive itself is 
subsumed within the cultural: the move toward the archiving of identity, and away from 
direct visualization, parallels the development of “one drop” politics as race becomes 
increasingly difficult to define visually. Additionally, the uniqueness of the fingerprint, and 
its role as both the site and the development of a technology that specifically identifies 
particular humans, is also the medium by which a person is stripped of individuality and even 
personhood as seen when Tom moves from white heir to Valet de Chamber to “erroneous 
inventory” (115). Thus, the organization of technology in the novel takes on the traits of the 
social organization of race. The archive itself becomes infected with the spectacular vitality 
of, and the speculation and risk within, nineteenth century biological and cultural 
determinism.  
In the next chapter of this project, Pauline E. Hopkins will confront the qualities that 
move Twain, in Pudd’nhead Wilson, to anxiously, and impossibly, attempt to technologically 
reconsolidate whiteness. Hopkins, however, uses the products of miscegenation to illustrate 
the complex sets of “necessary conditions” (226) that allow her to not only explore a new 
Negro identity, but most importantly, a newly naturalized American body.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Technologies of Development:  Repetition and Difference, Genre and Transfiguration 
in Pauline Hopkins’s Contending Forces 
 
In Chapter 3, I argued that Mark Twain, in Pudd’nhead Wilson, portrays white culture 
as using the new technology of fingerprinting to assert and reconsolidate the increasingly 
improvisational boundaries of whiteness. Fingerprinting comes to be the final marker of 
identity in the novel while ultimately stripping each man identified of his personhood.  
Additionally, the slave Roxana, who switched the infants so that her son would not be “sold 
down the river,” and who bears the narrative burden of genealogy and racial taxonomy for 
the majority of the novel, is personally destroyed at the story’s completion. Though the “real 
heir” continues to support her, “her hurts were too deep for money to heal; the spirit in her 
was quenched, her martial bearing departed with it, and the voice of her laughter ceased in 
the land.”1   
Twain’s elegiac tone in reference to Roxy is of note: she does not physically die—
though she is psychically conquered—and though Twain significantly, and sympathetically, 
enlarges the role of a mixed race woman in white fiction beyond that of the “tragic mulatta,” 
Roxy is still tragic, mulatta, and divested of the narrative and genealogical power Twain 
initially invests in her construction.2 Twain’s use of fingerprinting exemplifies how the 
archiving of the biological is disconcertingly both continuous and discontinuous to the very 
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bodies being identified; the tragic collapse of Roxy radically exposes what makes such use 
possible: the physical and sexual violence against women of African descent.  
This chapter argues that Pauline Hopkins’s novel Contending Forces: A Romance 
Illustrative of Negro Life North and South 3 expands upon the archival effects of work by 
authors such as Mark Twain. While Twain exploits the hypermediacy4 between bodies and 
technologies in order to counter how bodies evolve beyond previous constraints, especially in 
terms of race, Hopkins’s work radically moves in another direction. Hopkins develops a 
model of the past that reflects evolutionary sensibilities: rather than defined through its 
completedness or determination, the past rests instead upon what seem to be indeterminate 
values. In other words, a variation may biologically arise but we cannot interpret the impact 
of that variation until we see how it is used and whether it is heritable. In Origin of the 
Species, Charles Darwin addresses this in a manner that Hopkins would find to be as 
important culturally as biologically:  
differences blend into each other in an insensible series; and a series impresses the 
mind with the idea of an actual passage. Hence I look at individual differences, 
though of small interest to the systematist, as of high importance for us, as being the 
first step towards such slight varieties as are barely thought worth recording in works 
on natural history.5  
Hopkins combines this evolutionary sense of accumulation, passage, and indeterminacy 
within her work. Of additional importance, however, is how Hopkins structures memory 
within this network of accumulation and temporal indeterminacy. Memory, for Hopkins, 
becomes a historical and gendered object, a coproduction of the past and present that does 
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not simply reside in individuals. Instead, memory is materially deployed across specific lines 
of genealogy and supported by a network of evolutionary tools. 
The deployment of memory in such a manner allows Hopkins to move from a model 
of the tragic mulatta, the focusing of narrative upon the travails and liminalities of a single 
mixed race woman, to an exploration of the cumulative effects of miscegenation over a 
period of more than 100 years. For Hopkins, constructions of race, gender and memory come 
to include developmental tools that not only measure the biological and cultural inscriptions 
upon and within racialized bodies, but also chart the progress of these inscriptions across 
generations. Of equal importance, however, is the fact that descent is only “seen” 
retrospectively. The complex sets of “necessary conditions” (226) that come to fruition in 
nineteenth century Boston represent the present and future that come to fix the past, that 
come to finally deploy the past against the effects of slavery, miscegenation, and the 
contending forces of sexual and racial violence and prejudice.   
In other words, embodiment, for Hopkins, is an active, cumulative, and collective 
process that expresses a complex rendering of chance and necessity. She explores 
developmental processes through the potentialities of what mixed race individuals in post-
Reconstruction America might become, and the indeterminate states that such subjects 
emerge from. Such work requires that Hopkins do more than elucidate the physical and 
psychological characteristics of a single body or individual, and thus complicates what many 
view as her eugenic tendencies. Instead, Hopkins builds upon broad historical and biological 
effects to form a cumulative picture of social, racial, and national development. The products 
of miscegenation—the Montfort and Smith families, and Sappho Clark—operate as active 
and reactive terrains rather than deeply specified identities. Looking to characterization to 
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create a cumulative and emergent effect rather than producing specific identities allows 
Hopkins to profoundly dynamize time and memory. The past is drawn forward not simply as 
a genealogy but as a force that actively moves the subject into the future.   
As important, however, is how Hopkins explores the acquisition and use of genre in a 
similar manner. Scholars have noted how Hopkins makes use of generic devices such as the 
marriage plot, the drama of seduction, and the generic conventions of the sentimental. 
Claudia Tate “[identifies] the idealized domesticity” present in the works of authors such as 
Pauline Hopkins and how the “aesthetic value of these novels initially resided in their ability 
to gratify a distinct audience of ambitious black Americans” while they also “offered the 
recently emancipated an occasion for exercising political self-definition.”6 Ann duCille notes 
that the “marriage convention” specifically allowed black women writers to explore the 
“complex questions of sexuality and female subjectivity.” The work of authors such as 
Hopkins is “characterized by sexual reticence, the literary purification of black womanhood, 
and the celebration of marriage as a seemingly sexless meeting of like minds and 
sociopolitical ambitions.”7 I argue, however, that Hopkins uses genre much like the 
biological development and accumulation of traits. Genres function, for Hopkins, as both the 
exhibiting of an archive and as groups of tools that write a new form of the American body.  
Additionally, by destabilizing how such genres are deployed in the first place, Hopkins is 
able to use the literary as she uses evolution and memory.  
As chance effects of slavery, miscegenation, and the contending forces of sexual and 
racial violence and prejudice, Hopkins, then, theorizes a set of “necessary conditions” (226) 
that simultaneously inform past and future formations of an American body. The 
accumulation of biological and literary traits do not function separately for Hopkins.  
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Together, these techniques, the modeling of both the biological and the literary, not only 
assist Hopkins in exploring a new Negro identity, but most importantly, a newly naturalized 
American body, one that is naturalized through the process of narration. 
 
A “different solution” to the Negro Problem 
Contending Forces follows the multi-generational story of families such as the 
Montforts and the Smiths. Beginning in eighteenth-century Bermuda with the slave holding 
Montforts, the story narrates the Montfort’s transfer of their estate to Newbern (sic), N.C. in 
order to continue to legally hold slaves. In Newbern (sic), Grace Montfort is accused of being 
a mulatta, symbolically raped, and commits suicide. Her husband is murdered, and her two 
children are thrown into slavery. One child eventually ends up in England and is raised as 
white, while the other child escapes to the North, lives his life out as a Negro and becomes 
the patriarch of the Smith family in Boston. The progression of these two families is enough 
for Hopkins to inaugurate a discussion of the dispersal and accumulation of biological and 
racial traits, of the roles of both inheritance and culture. Most importantly, however, Hopkins 
introduces concepts drawn from evolutionary theory in order to follow the generational and 
cumulative effects of women such as Grace Montfort and Sappho Clark. By making a 
theoretical connection between biological and racial development between these two women, 
Hopkins is able to remodel the meaning of the past and to finally deploy the past against the 
effects of slavery, miscegenation, and the contending forces of sexual and racial violence and 
prejudice.   
Hopkins’s explication of evolution theory often feels cobbled together out of mixed 
notions of heredity, breeding, natural and social law, religion, and chance. She mixes notions 
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of the “march of progress, which the most enlightened nations are unconsciously forced to 
make by the great law of advancement” (20) with hauntings by ghosts and fortune telling. 
She notes the “mighty unexpected results of the law of evolution” (87) while simultaneously 
invoking the “will of Providence” (65). Additionally, she appears to give conflicting views 
on how she values the Negro. Evolution “[seems] to point to a different solution of the Negro 
question than any worked out by the most fertile brain of the highly cultured Caucasian” 
(87). The potential effects of evolution, however, and the sarcasm directed toward 
Caucasians, seems lost when further down on the same page she refers to whites as a 
“superior race” (87). The elements of Hopkins’s racial theories that appear haphazard or 
conflicting resolve, however, if Contending Forces is analyzed through a model of biological 
and literary development that relies on three aspects of evolutionary theory—the 
normalization of change, innate characteristics, and the accumulation of traits.   
The normalization of change is an important tenet of both the scientific and cultural 
elements of evolutionary theory. As Edward J. Larson notes in his history of evolution, 
many, even among naturalists, “instinctively opposed the idea that species evolve, at least in 
part because it normalized change. Largely for the same reason, social radicals…inevitably 
embraced it.”8 For Hopkins, biological and cultural change is central to the historical and 
contemporary circumstances of African Americans, and she uses the notions of “organic 
succession and development,” popularized by nineteenth century scientists, to make her 
case.9 The manner in which Hopkins must sort through the normalization of change through 
succession and development, however, is complex. The implications of this complexity are 
twofold: one, Hopkins most profoundly highlights this complexity through women, and two, 
Hopkins does not fear looking at both black and white lines of genealogy. As a mixed race 
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person, while she may abhor the circumstances arising out of slavery that created her 
biological heritage, she still explores both lines of genealogy, along with the racial and 
cultural variation brought to both the African and European lines, as developmental 
opportunities.  
This point of view is contentious for whites and blacks as both groups, generally 
speaking, are interested in racial consolidation. For whites in the United States, the post-
Reconstruction period is marked by efforts to reconsolidate whiteness, to deny, in effect, any 
political or social equality between whites and blacks. This requires that any individual with 
evidence of African descent, no matter their skin color, be recognized as black. Court cases 
such as Plessy v. Ferguson that came before the United States Supreme Court in 1896, 
confirmed a “one drop” mentality in the United States—no matter what skin color an 
individual may have, the Supreme Court decision not only upheld the notion of two distinct 
races even in the face of miscegenation, but the law also upheld the idea of separate but equal 
before the law. As Justice Henry Billings Brown stated for the majority: 
The object of the [Fourteenth] Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute 
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have 
been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as 
distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms 
unsatisfactory to either.10 
In Contending Forces, however, Hopkins highlights the “race of mulattoes” (151). Radically, 
she insinuates that, rather than a new human phenomenon of the post-Reconstruction era, this 
“race” has been in existence, and transnationally active, for quite some time. Walter Benn 
Michaels notes in his analysis of Hopkins’s 1902-3 serialized novel, Of One Blood,11 
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Hopkins writes, “but who is clear enough in vision to decide who hath black blood 
and who hath it not?” (607). Put this way, the question is an epistemological one but, 
of course, the real question raised by the citation from Acts is ontological: If “all 
nations” are made “of one blood,” how can anyone have “black blood” and anyone 
else not have it? One possible answer is that no one can, that there is no such thing as 
black blood or white blood, or at least that, given the history of black and white 
“amalgamation” (535) in North America, there is no such thing as black or white 
blood anymore…On this account the mulatto marks the disappearance of racial 
identity, and the “white” skin of Hopkins’s central characters is an emblem of the 
disappearance of the color line…”12 
Michael’s analysis is off the mark in reference to the disappearance of racial identity—
Hopkins goes to great lengths to accentuate racial uplift through the marriages of Dora Smith 
and Sappho Clark to prominent race men; but even knowing that the color line remains an 
important condition for Hopkins does not mean, as Hazel Carby suggests, that the mulatta is 
simply a figure of mediation.13 Instead, Hopkins’s novel insists that the figure of the mulatta 
has been an active, and integrated, cultural and societal figure for some time.  
The integration of the mulatta into an active transnational and multi-generational 
figure not only allows Hopkins to shift the mulatta out of the status of mediator into a state of 
active transfiguration in America; such claims also take the creation of the mulatta out of the 
hands of white female abolitionists. As Teresa C. Zackodnik has documented, the mulatta 
“functioned in post-Civil War American fiction as a sensationalized figure of ruined 
womanhood.”14 Hopkins, however, by suggesting, first, that Grace Montfort is of mixed 
blood, and second, by documenting her transformation from that of rich planter’s wife to 
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tragic mulatta prior to sexual abuse, shifts the sensationalism away from considerations of 
the plight of a singular woman to the hysteria of white Americans.15 Thus, the mixed race 
woman is revealed as a historically, and transnationally, integrated figure rather than the 
creation of white abuse and white abolitionist zeal. 
Hopkins documents this active integration in Contending Forces by using some of the 
tenets of evolutionary theory to document, both biologically and culturally, a narrative of 
descent that connects the figure of the mulatta from the eighteenth century forward. An 
analysis of Hopkins’s utopic presentation of race formation in Bermuda reveals her 
understanding of the effects this evolving racial formation has had on the evolution of Britain 
as a nation. Additionally, this analysis provides an alternative conception of Hopkins’s use of 
eugenics and how the introduction of black blood, and not simply the accumulation of white 
traits, comes to set up not only what Hopkins refers to as the “necessary conditions” of 
biological and cultural evolution but also the narrative transfiguration of the American body 
(226).   
 
Bermuda, Descent, and the “Necessary Conditions” 
[Bermuda’s] importance to the mother country as a military and naval stations has 
drawn the paternal bonds of interest closer as the years have flown by. Indeed, Great 
Britain has been kind to the colonist of this favored island…sheltering and shielding 
them so carefully that the iron hand of the master has never shown beneath the velvet 
glove. So Bermuda has always been intensely British—intensely loyal…a temperate 
climate, limpid rivers, the balmy fragrance and freshness of the air, no 
winter…Indeed, slavery never reached its lowest depths in this beautiful island; but a 
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desire for England’s honor and greatness had become a passion with the inhabitants… 
(21-2) 
The quotation above portrays Bermuda as a particular developmental niche, a 
paradise “shelter[ed] and shield[ed]” in a manner that fostered not only intense political 
loyalty from the inhabitants but also fostered a certain type of biological development. In 
fact, though Hopkins refers to the national and transnational effects of race, she chooses to 
use products of particular niches to exemplify the possibilities of these effects.  
It could be argued that the majority of authors take such approaches to the 
development of fictional characters—generally speaking, characterization is about the 
discreet particularization of an entity, and that particularization includes attention to place 
and action, the construction of a niche, or what narrative theorists such as Marie Laure Ryan 
and David Herman refer to as model or possible worlds.16 Hopkins, however, uses the notion 
of niche from a specific evolutionary point of view. One reference to such developmental 
concerns by Hopkins is voiced through the character of Mrs. Willis:  
Let the world, by its need of us along certain lines, and our intrinsic fitness for these 
lines, push us into the niche which God has prepared for us. So shall our lives be 
beautified and our race raised in the civilization of the future as we grow away from 
all these prejudices which have been the instruments of our advancement. (152)  
The setting of Bermuda serves as such a niche where “amalgamation with the higher race” 
(22-3) not only creates Hopkins’s “race of mulattoes” but also positively modifies British 
democracy by serving as an exemplar of what a new racial configuration can bring to the 
nation—economic success and the moral completion of democratic ideals through the 
emancipation of slaves. Mulattoes themselves are “rich planters or business men” (23) and 
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the moral clime “never reached its lowest depth” (22) as it had in other slave holding nations, 
such as the United States. In spite of Hopkins contradictory language (the “higher race,” the 
“polluting” of white “vitality” with “African blood” (23)), it is clear that the infusion of black 
blood has been developmentally a positive element for the British nation along with the 
biological evolution of a culturally and economically successful and new racial 
configuration. 
 The Montfort family is exemplary of Hopkins’s exploration of niche development.  
Charles and Grace Montfort themselves possibly emerge from racially mixed lines of 
descent. Hopkins notes that  
there might even have been a strain of African blood polluting the fair stream of 
Montfort’s vitality, or even his wife’s, which fact would not have caused him one 
instant’s uneasiness. (23) 
The Montfort’s polluted bloodline has developed into a biological and cultural type that 
epitomizes the potentialities emerging from Bermuda. Charles is a successful planter who is 
“neither a cruel man, nor an avaricious one” in spite of his position as a slave owner (22). 
Grace Montfort is not only “perfectly molded…a most lovely type of Southern beauty” (40); 
she is also loving, generous, and well educated (45). Additionally, the two children are noted 
to be much like their mother, especially Jesse, whose line of descent establishes the African 
American Smith family of Boston. Hopkins’s rhetoric of pollution, again, is paradoxical, and 
while we cannot lose track of the many reasons why such paradoxes may exist—for example, 
Hopkins’s attempts at engaging both a black and white readership17—I argue that we are still 
left with the fact that African blood is a necessary component of biological and political 
advancement. After all, the completion of the novel insists not simply on a happy ending for 
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the mulatta Sappho Clark but on the conjoining of the destinies of the Montfort line of 
descent with that of Sappho Clark, as well as conjoining the Old World with the New World 
through the travels of Sappho and Will Smith from the United States to Britain. Thus, it is of 
great importance to note the attention Hopkins devotes to the Montfort’s potentially polluted 
bloodline, and how, developmentally, the figures of Sappho Clark and Grace Montfort 
connect through a new understanding of biological descent along with cultural descent. 
Hopkins follows these lines of descent that connect the two women to demonstrate 
that while the utopic niche of Bermuda has contributed to racial and national development, 
there is no final transfiguration of the Montforts themselves. The moral failings of Charles 
Montfort—that he will not give up slavery and transfers both family and estate out of 
Hopkins’s utopic version of Bermuda—forecloses not only any final transfiguration of 
Montfort, but also of his entire family. Also of importance, however, is that Grace Montfort 
herself, in spite of the near angelic description of both her beauty and kindness, participates 
in the extension of the unequal relationships between owners and their slaves. Her 
relationship with Lucy, described as that of “inseparable friends rather than of mistress and 
slave,” is distinguished by the fact that Lucy still calls her “Miss Grace” and speaks in 
Hopkins’s version of slave dialect (46). As Grace T. Randle has noted,  
Lifelong exposure to a system based upon racial hegemony has blinded Grace to the 
inherent inequality embodied in her “friendship” with Lucy. She fails to note that a 
lack of reciprocity is involved—Lucy does ‘Miss Grace’s’ bidding, but Grace does 
not do Lucy’s.18 
This point is most painfully accentuated after Grace is converted into a tragic mulatta: after 
the family settles in the United States, she is rumored to have a “black streak” within her 
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(41), and confronted by the “unlawful love” of the white Anson Pollock (45) who has 
murdered her husband, she chooses suicide over rape, and her children are thrown into 
slavery. While Grace dies in the fashion associated with the tragic mulatta, Lucy, rather than 
Grace, becomes the object of rape and sexual abuse by Anson Pollack.  
Rather than personalities, then, Hopkins develops the Montforts as active and reactive 
terrains, as evolutionary and biological products, whose cumulative function will move from 
the biological to the cultural, from the evolutionary development of “certain 
lines…push[ed]…into the niche which God has prepared” (152) to the revolutionary setting 
of Boston where moral transfiguration will finally occur. Through the concept of 
transfiguration, Hopkins’s Christianity works in combination with her understanding of 
biology and evolution. The Montfort’s development in Bermuda, though replete with cultural 
and moral potential, represents a past most intensely defined biologically. As a basis for 
descent, as a pool of traits, the Montforts, most specifically Grace Montfort, are figures 
whose evolving potentials, whose use, is indeterminate.  
 
Trait Accumulation and Eugenics  
If biological development in the novel serves to highlight not personality but the 
necessary conditions for racial transfiguration, then Pauline Hopkins’s understanding of 
eugenics must be re-examined. When I argue for a reanalysis of Hopkins’s engagement with 
eugenics, I do not insist that Hopkins has freed herself from some of the troubling aspects of 
eugenic principles circulating during her era. Hopkins’s argument, however, cannot be 
reduced to what critics such as John Nickel, in “Eugenics and the Fiction of Pauline 
Hopkins,” state: that “Hopkins suggests that the black race needs white racial traits in order 
  90 
to improve the race’s position within society.”19 After all, figures such as W.E.B. DuBois, 
whom Hopkins is often politically associated with, engaged in eugenic thinking.20 As 
Gregory Michael Dorr notes, DuBois, known most explicitly for his analyses of race as a 
historical object rather than a biological certainty had 
a healthy respect for the notion of genetic ‘fitness’ and ‘unfitness’” in the late 
nineteenth century. And this provided part of the intellectual foundations for his 
famous formulation, the “Talented Tenth”—the best and most able representatives of 
African America whose fitness destined them to lead blacks to equality.21 
In “The Conservation of Races,” Dubois states that ““there are differences—subtle, delicate 
and elusive, though they may be—which have silently but definitely separated men into 
groups.”22 He further states that the future of African Americans should not be “absorption 
by the white Americans.”23   
In Contending Forces, however, Hopkins, though dedicated to racial uplift, expresses 
no concern in reference to amalgamation. Instead, her concern rests with the use of what has 
come into being now, the new race of mulattoes, and how the now refigures the past. Thus, 
while Hopkins is interested in trait accumulation and the innate virtuosity of women of 
African descent, it is actually through the co-production of the past and present that such 
qualities come to bear any relation to the future of the new American race.  
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Repetition and Descent  
Hopkins’s emphasis on the coproduction of the past and present allows her to deal 
with the evolutionary, and eugenic, concepts of innate characteristics and trait accumulation 
in a different manner than other authors of this period, and she accomplishes this through the 
notion of repetition rather than simply accumulation or inheritability. As I argued earlier, 
Hopkins develops characters historically and biologically as active and reactive terrains 
rather than distinct personalities, as evolutionary and biological products, whose cumulative 
function will move across both the biological to the cultural; such movement involves both 
direct inheritance of traits and the repetition of events that come to form the moral evolution 
and transfiguration of characters.  
Action and reaction between characters arises out of elements of heredity, whether 
through the “combination of the worst features of a dominant race with an enslaved race” 
(91), or through an accumulation of biological traits that create sets of conditions between 
characters. Thus, characters are often placed in historically repetitive situations. John P. 
Langley, for example, a direct descendant of Anson Pollack and the Montfort’s slave Lucy, is 
described as  
the natural product of such an institution as slavery. Natural instinct for good had 
been perverted by a mixture of "cracker" blood of the lowest type on his father's side 
with whatever God-saving quality that might have been loaned the Negro by pitying 
nature. This blood, while it gave him the pleasant features of the Caucasian race, 
vitiated his moral nature and left it stranded high and dry on the shore of blind 
ignorance, and there he seemed content to dwell, supinely self-satisfied with the 
narrow boundary of the horizon of his mental vision. (222) 
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Langley’s great-great uncle, Anson Pollack, was prepared to rape Grace Montfort and did 
rape Lucy. Like Pollack, John Langley attempts to coerce Sappho Clark into an illicit sexual 
relationship against her will. As important, however, is that Langley’s inherited “moral 
nature” creates the set of conditions that allow Hopkins to forward Grace Montfort and 
Sappho Clark as templates exhibiting not the specificity of individual mixed race women, but 
rather the accretionary effects of miscegenation, the action and reaction of race and biology 
in complex interaction with contending, and often repetitive social forces. 
There are three episodes worth discussing from this point of view—the initial 
symbolic rape of Grace Montfort, the actual rape of Sappho Clark when she was fourteen 
years old, and Sappho’s resistance to rape by John Langley. Each of these events is part of an 
evolving response to rape by women of African descent, while simultaneously making use of 
the resulting miscegenation. Each of these events also contributes to Hopkins’s notion that 
the literary can, and should, through its own process of genre development, contribute to the 
naturalization of the new Negro and thus, a newly naturalized American body. 
 
Grace Montfort and Literary Forms of Transfiguration 
Alongside the title page of Contending Forces, readers are confronted with the vivid 
illustration exhibiting the character of Grace Montfort collapsed on the ground after being 
bound to a post and whipped by two white men after they have murdered her husband. 
Grace’s dress is pulled down to her waist and what we see are the bloody marks of the whip 
upon her pale back along with a pool of blood upon the ground. The two men who stand 
above Grace Montfort are no doubt the men who have whipped her, but as Hazel Carby has 
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so poignantly written, the posture of the men, how they stand, how they hold the whips, is 
indicative of more than the physical violence of the whipping. Carby states that  
Hopkins represented the brutal rape of Grace in the displaced form of a whipping by 
two of the vigilantes…Hopkins’s metaphoric replacement of the “snaky, leather 
thong” for the phallus was a crude but effective device, and “the blood [which] stood 
in a pool about her feet” was the final evidence that the “outrage” that had been 
committed was rape.24 
And though Carby importantly emphasizes the link that Hopkins makes between “the violent 
act of rape and its specific political use as a device of terrorism,”25 it is also worth noting the 
generic convention, that of the tragic mulatta, that Hopkins deploys in order to construct how 
such an incident and how such a character come to hold meaning in the late nineteenth 
century.   
I previously argued against Hazel Carby’s stance that, in Contending Forces, “the 
figure of the mulatto should be understood and analyzed as a narrative device of 
mediation.”26 While I agree with Carby that “historically the mulatto, as a narrative figure, 
has [had] two primary functions—“as a vehicle for an exploration of the relationship between 
the races and, at the same time, an expression of the relationship between the races” 27 — 
Pauline Hopkins intends that the figure of the mulatta move beyond mediation. Figures such 
as Grace Montfort and Sappho Clark clearly convey the histories of sexual and physical 
violence that women of African descent have endured from slavery into the post-
Reconstruction era. Rather than explore the mulatta as simply a “narrative device of 
mediation,” Hopkins deploys the tragic mulatta in the manner of an evolving literary form.   
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In the preface to Contending Forces, Hopkins defines the “great value” of fiction as 
“a record of growth and development from generation to generation” (14).  Hopkins’s 
narrative of development includes an analysis of literature as archival, as a cumulative 
collection reflecting the social and cultural development of humans. The conceptual 
expansion of what the tragic mulatta comes to represent in Contending Forces moves the 
figure from narrative device to generic form. Exploring the mulatta as a genre supports not 
only how Hopkins deploys the bodies of characters such as Grace Montfort within the text 
through the accretionary effects of miscegenation, through the action and reaction of race and 
biology in complex interaction with contending, and often repetitive social forces; the 
designation additionally gestures toward the archival effects of literature. Hopkins engages 
with the genre of the tragic mulatta, then, through John Frow’s understanding of the use of 
genre, of how genre can be used to posit “questions of meaning and truth as questions of 
form.”28   
Most importantly, however, the genre of the tragic mulatta, as used by Hopkins, 
further emphasizes what the character of Grace Montfort expresses biologically and 
evolutionarily. The tragic mulatta as a generic form works to co-produce the past and present.  
Just as, biologically, Hopkins’s concern rests with the use of what has come into being now, 
the new race of mulattoes, and how this new racial formation refigures the past and comes to, 
finally, determine its meaning, so with the literary. By presenting Grace Montfort as 
simultaneously categorized as a white woman, as possibly a mixed race woman, and a tragic 
mulatta, Contending Forces not only uses the form to historically contextualize the genre and 
the narrative figures within the novel, but Hopkins’s use of the genre reveals the 
indeterminate status of the form in the first place. Thus, the physical and (figurative) sexual 
  95 
violence committed against Grace Montfort, categorized as white, reworks the category of 
what counted as tragic and mulatta to begin with and reworks categorization itself, revealing 
not only the cumulative effects of the biological but also the cumulative effects of the 
literary. The modeling of the biological and the literary through the templates of Grace 
Montfort and Sappho Clark assist Hopkins in exploring a new Negro identity and a newly 
naturalized American body, one that is naturalized through the process of narration. 
The narrative structure of the tragic mulatta originates in stories such as “The 
Quadroons” and “Slavery’s Pleasant Homes” by Lydia Maria Child in the1840s.29 Critics 
such as Teresa C. Zackodnik, Jean Fagin Yellen, and Karen Sànchez-Eppler note that stories 
such as those by Child refer as much to white women as to enslaved women.30 Hopkins, 
however, counters even this observation by definitively categorizing Grace Montfort, the 
tragic mulatta, as white. Rather than the figure serving to speak “to the concerns of free white 
women,” as Yellen observes, the figure of Grace Montfort is about an entirely different 
configuration of race, one not identifiable through the categories of black or white, or even 
free or enslaved.31 The position of Grace Montfort, in fact, remains uninterpretable until later 
events in Boston that include the presence of Sappho Clark, come to finally declare the past’s 
meaning. In relation to form and narrative structure, then, the genre of the tragic mulatta is 
deployed as part of Hopkins’s narrative of development that includes an analysis of literature 
as archival, as a cumulative collection reflecting the social and cultural development of 
humans, a generic component of the already and the not yet, a form whose use has not been 
established, and exists, as Jacques Derrida suggests in “The Law of Genre,” as “a sort of 
participation without belonging—a taking part in without being part of, without having 
membership of a set.”32 Simultaneously, however, the effects of genre, as with the effects of 
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Hopkins’s ideal of racial transformation, will come to transfigure literature through another 
set of biological and generic necessary conditions involving Sappho Clark.  
 
Sappho Clark: Repetition and Difference 
Grace Montfort, as both a biological and generic configuration, attains a status 
popularly known as that of the tragic mulatta; this status simultaneously forecloses any racial 
or moral transfiguration for Grace. However, the conditions of her existence form a paradox 
of indeterminacy. She is somehow white and black, biologically and morally “perfect” yet 
part of a slave owning family, and finally, confronted with physical and sexual violence, she 
is unable to overcome the contending forces of prejudice and violence finally conforming to 
a reactive type. The character of Grace Montfort operates as a reactive terrain, both as a 
biological and generic configuration, rather than as a specific individual. In other words, 
without the interpretive force of the present, the racial and moral transfiguration that operates 
through Sappho Clark, Grace Montfort would simply reflect history as static and determined, 
and Hopkins’s use of eugenics would simply reflect the biological accumulation of traits.  
Instead, Grace Montfort’s line of descent reveals the biological and cultural 
complexities of emergent embodiment in the United States emphasizing Hopkins’s view of 
embodiment as an active, cumulative, and collective process. Grace Montfort’s line of 
descent is not a simple tracing of blood relations from generation to generation; the most 
important element of plot development is not the final revelation of kinship between Mrs. 
Smith of Boston and Charles Montfort-Withington of England (370-381). The tracing of 
blood kinship is important proof for how “such as distinguished woman” as Mrs. Smith 
“evolved from among the brutalized aftermath of slavery” and revelatory of the historical 
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significance of the “strangely tangled threads of many colored families” due to 
miscegenation. Of equal importance, however, is that Hopkins’s understanding of the 
cumulative and collective processes of evolution allow her to expand on just what “line of 
descent” comes to mean. A broader view of line of descent beyond bloodlines allows 
Hopkins to develop a definition of descent that comes to center most firmly upon gender 
development—with a specific focus on mixed race women—along with the influence of 
Christianity. The evolutionary concepts of repetition and difference, in combination with 
Hopkins’s belief in the cultural and biological development of moral traits, allow her to forge 
clear developmental connections between Grace Montfort and Sappho Clark. Through these 
connections, Hopkins classifies the two women as cumulative and emergent effects that 
coproduce the present and past rather than specific identities that simply have particular static 
histories.  
The method that Hopkins first uses to link Grace Montfort and Sappho Clark is 
through biological descent. Hopkins complicates the notion of what counts as a biological 
linkage, however, by focusing not on connections through family and blood, but through the 
biological and social construction of mixed race women. As noted earlier, Hopkins accounts 
for Montfort’s development through the niche of environmental and biological perfection 
attained in Bermuda.  Grace Montfort  
was a dream of beauty even among beautiful women.  Tall and slender; her form was 
willowy, although perfectly molded.  Her complexion was creamy in its whiteness, of 
the tint of the camellia; her hair, a rich golden brown, fell in rippling masses far 
below the waist line; brown eyes, large and soft as those seen in the fawn; heavy 
  98 
black eyebrows marking a high white forehead, and features as clearly cut as a 
cameo, completed a most lovely type of Southern beauty. (40) 
Hopkins endows Sappho Clark with a similarly remarkable Southern beauty with that 
beauty arising out of a similarly remarkable biological niche:  
Tall and fair, with hair of a golden cast, aquiline nose, rosebud mouth, soft brown 
eyes veiled by long, dark lashes which swept her cheek, just now covered with a 
delicate rose flush…a combination of “queen rose and lily in one.” (107). 
When other tenants of Mrs. Smith’s house meet Clark they state 
“Lord,” said Ophelia Davis to her friend Sarah Ann, “I haven’t see enything look 
like thet chile since I lef’ home.” 
“That’s the truth, ‘Phelia,” replied Sarah Ann; “that’s something’ God made, 
honey; thar ain’t nothin’ like thet growed outside o’ Loosyannie.” (107) 
New Orleans’s tolerance of people of mixed race is much like that of Bermuda rather than 
the United States at large. Malini Johar Schueller notes that mulattoes in New Orleans 
“constituted a distinct third category that cannot be fully understood through the blackwhite 
binary.”33 Referencing the historian Joel Williamson, she suggests that “a black-white 
distinction based on versions of the one drop was not in force in New Orleans.”34 Just as the 
possibility of mixed blood in the Montfort line did not prevent them from becoming wealthy 
planters, so it was in New Orleans with mulattoes.  
Unlike Hopkins’s utopic Bermuda, however, New Orleans, after 1850, begins to 
change: Schueller states that after the passage of Fugitive Slave Law, “long-running 
intolerance toward miscegenation elsewhere began to exert pressure in the lower South [and] 
mulattoes began to quickly lose their special status.”35 The Montforts react to shifts in the 
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political and racial economy of Bermuda by transferring their estate to North Carolina where 
Charles Montfort is murdered and Grace Montfort commits suicide. Sappho Clark, reflecting 
both her racial development and the changing politics of racial life in the city of New 
Orleans, is victimized in a similar manner. As Luke Sawyer, who knew Sappho Clark (under 
her real name, Mabelle Beaubean) describes it before The American Colored League in 
Boston, Clark was kidnapped and raped by her half-uncle then abandoned in a New Orleans 
brothel: 
Crazed with grief, Monsieur Beaubean faced his brother and accused him of his 
crime. 'Well,' said he, 'whatever damage I have done I am willing to pay for. But your 
child is no better than her mother or her grandmother. What does a woman of mixed 
blood, or any Negress, for that matter, know of virtue? It is my belief that they were a 
direct creation by God to be the pleasant companions of men of my race…That night 
his house was mobbed…I seized Mabelle and wrapped her in a blanket. Watching my 
chance I stole from the house after the fire was well under way, and miraculously 
reached a place of safety. I took Mabelle to the colored convent at New Orleans, and 
left her there in the care of the sisters. There she died when her child was born!" (260-
61) 
Mabelle Beaubean, however, does not die; she bears the child, takes on the name of Sappho 
Clark and later moves to Boston, significantly contributing to her own social construction.   
Through biological and cultural construction, rather than through blood descent, 
through her beauty, her white appearance, and a history of sexual and physical violence, 
Sappho Clark is a near replica of Grace Montfort. Such replication may seem to fit into a 
prominent trend of the use of twins or the doubling of characters often seen in American 
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fiction at this time.36 Certainly, Hopkins sets up a number of parallels between characters, 
and between characters and figures of renown outside of the text: examples of this include 
the parallels of characterization between Will Smith and W.E.B. DuBois, and between Dr. 
Arthur Lewis and Booker T. Washington. The relationship between the characters of Grace 
Montfort and Sappho Clark, however, indicates that Hopkins has a different process in mind 
than the examples of parallel characterization noted above.  First, the physical resemblance 
and similar biological construction does matter in association with eugenics. Charles Galton 
himself was interested in using twins to support his belief that heredity trumped environment 
in terms of trait development, and Galton’s twin theories were used in the United States to 
depict blacks as inferior.37 Most importantly, however, is that the near replication of Grace 
Montfort through Sappho Clark allows Hopkins to explore the transmissibility of biology and 
culture through the concept of reiteration, or what could be called repetition and difference.  
The reiterative effects of Grace Montfort through Sappho Clark could be explicitly 
theorized through scholars such as Judith Butler. Certainly, Butler’s description of the 
materialization of bodies through the “forcible reiteration” of norms, through the 
performativity that discourse produces, fits quite well with the social and sexual construction 
of the tragic mulatta, and could be used to track the relationship between Grace Montfort and 
Sappho Clark.38 Of additional value is the work of Gilles Deleuze who specifically theorizes 
difference and repetition.  For Deleuze, difference inhabits repetition in how the mind 
“contemplates” repetition. In reflection, repetition is a “contraction of instants” forming a 
“synthesis of time.” Using this principle to analyze Contending Forces immediately brings to 
mind Hopkins’s use of time and history, and how, as Deleuze states 
  101 
It is in the present that time is deployed. To it belong both the past and the future: the 
past in so far as the preceding instants are retained in the contraction; the future 
because its expectation is anticipated in this same contraction.”39 
These two theorists, then, could provide a framework for understanding the materialization of 
the social and sexual subject categorized as the tragic mulatta while simultaneously 
understanding the movement and difference of the repetition of such materialization across 
time. Indeed, one of the values of this framework is to note, as Hopkins does through the 
transfiguration of Sappho Clark, that the figure of the tragic mulatta is not static or actual, but 
a kind of virtual terrain upon which many have tried to cement racial constructions.  
 What is most important, however, is to explore how Hopkins herself formulates and 
defines the materialization of bodies through an understanding of repetition and difference. 
While the underpinnings of her work take into account many of the concerns that define the 
work of theorists such as Butler and Deleuze, Hopkins defines and explores such principles 
through a combination of evolutionary theory and Christianity. Human emergence, as 
defined through Darwinism, occurs through an immense amount of repetition along with 
often “insensible” difference that may accumulate over time. 40  Christianity, generally 
speaking, posits not simply forgiveness of sins and life after death, but the “resurrection of 
the body.”41 For Hopkins, certain tenets of evolutionary theory match her theology. Thus, 
materialization and reiteration are informed through biology and morality, descent and 
transfiguration, and these elements come to inform each other through the transformation of 
time and history. In her profile of Touissaint L’Ouverture in the Colored American 
Magazine, Hopkins states that “The voice of history is the voice of God.”42  
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The material and reiterative connections of Grace Montfort and Sappho Clark 
coproduce the past and present through both the equivalency of and the difference between 
the two women. While Grace Montfort is figuratively raped and commits suicide, Mabelle 
Beaubean is literally raped and what follows is a form of figurative, not actual, death as she 
bears a child, changes her name, and moves to Boston. Clark’s equivalency with Grace 
Montfort, along with the differences, suggests a rising arc of transfigurative action in the 
novel.  
Hopkins suggests the possibilities of such transfigurative action through the 
combination of descent and Christianity earlier in the novel through the figure of Jesse 
Montfort at the moment he becomes a fugitive slave. As Jesse works on a dock in New York 
City, the following conversation occurs:   
“Speak to the cap’n,” called a man standing near; “that’s nuthin’ but a nigger 
you’re talkin’ to.” 
“Well,” said the one who had first addressed [Jesse], “you’re a likely boy, 
anyhow; who do you belong to?” 
Jesse arose from his seat, white with passion, and said to the man: I am no 
man’s property; I belong to Jesus Christ!” (77) 
After this exchange, Jesse escapes; he does not, however, attempt to regain his status as a 
white man. Instead, he later marries a woman of African descent and “was absorbed into that 
unfortunate race, of whom it is said that a man had better be born dead than to come into the 
world as part and parcel of it” (79). The completion of Jesse’s absorption into blackness is 
important in that, first, the transformation is the outcome of a testament of religious faith, and 
second, it is an affirmation of his identification as mixed race rather than white. As the novel 
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moves forward, moral transfiguration requires that characters such as Jesse Montfort fully 
confront themselves as mixed race individuals rather than make any claims of whiteness. 
The final transfigurative moments in the text center on how Sappho Clark is not only 
grounded as a repetition of Grace Montfort biologically, but how Clark must renegotiate a 
repetition of the configuration that positioned Montfort as a tragic mulatta. Thus, a version of 
Anson Pollock (John Langley) and a version of Grace Montfort (Sappho Clark) meet again. 
However, in this repetition, the elements of seduction are materially organized within and 
between candidly mixed race individuals who represent both a unique “synthesis of time,” a 
“contraction of instants” between Grace Montfort and Sappho Clark.43 Yet, as with Grace 
Montfort’s position within the genre of the tragic mulatta, Clark is generically “a sort of 
participation without belonging—a taking part in without being part of, without having 
membership of a set.” 44 In other words, she engages the form of tragedy and seduction, in 
fact embodies the form, yet she will come to not only redefine what the form of seduction 
materially consists of but also what was indeterminate about the form in the first place.  
As Jennifer Rae Greerson observes, tales of seduction have always held a certain 
attraction for American readers: 
in the early Republic, the seduction plot held special relevance for readers living 
through the upheavals of rapid modernization and social reorganization. By moving 
the marriage relation out of a broader familial-social context, and into a fraught 
transaction between two isolated characters, the seduction plot enacted the shift from 
a society organized around kin networks, community controls, and face-to-face 
interactions, to a society made up of a collection of atomized and anonymous 
individuals.45  
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Hopkins takes these same notions of “the fraught transaction between two isolated 
characters,” but moves the effect to principally be the fraught transaction between two 
women across time, emphasizing, and again redefining, what counts as line of descent and 
contracting the elements of anonymity and atomization for those of mixed blood in the 
United States. If Greerson notes that it is an American dilemma to face the shift from “kin” 
and “community” to “atomized and anonymous individuals,” what then, Hopkins may ask, 
could be more American than being a person of mixed race in post-Reconstruction America? 
Hopkins takes a deeply American genre and social dynamic into the heart of the sexual 
trauma and gender construction of African American women. Thus, the plot of seduction 
becomes intensely materialized within Hopkins’s novel not only to account for the repetition 
of physical and sexual violence encountered by women both during and after slavery, but 
also for the racial and moral transfiguration of Americans in the post-Reconstruction era.  
Clark’s first encounter with rape occurs when she is a fourteen-year-old child. 
Kidnapped by her white half-uncle, she is raped and abandoned in “a house of the vilest 
character in the lowest portion of the city of New Orleans” (260).  Clark has a child from the 
encounter but does not raise the child or acknowledge that she is the boy’s mother. She 
moves to Boston but the past and future, in a sense, follows her to the new setting not only in 
the form of her child and the “grand aunt” Madame Francis who cares for him (329), but also 
in the form of Luke Sawyer, who, in the retelling of his own life story tells the story of the 
rape of Mabelle Beaubean, Sappho Clark’s real name. Each of these characters—Luke 
Sawyer, her child Alphonse, and Madam Frances—represent the simultaneity of 
past/present/future: Sawyer in the retelling of the past and in disrupting Clark’s anonymity, 
and the child in the recollection of her responsibilities in the present as a mother and in an 
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explicit representation of a newly conceptualized racial future. Madame Frances, however, in 
her ability to read the future through the remnants of African psychic abilities, is perhaps the 
strongest character in associating Clark with the simultaneity of past/present/future.  
Instead of looking to characters such as Madam Frances, critics often emphasize the 
role of figures such as Mrs. Willis through her explicit enactment of the black women’s club 
movement in the United States and how she forwards virtue as a biologically innate 
characteristic in women of African descent. In the sense of the contraction of time along with 
descent, however, Madam Frances stands out as a character who contracts and transforms a 
reading of time in a more transfigurative sense. Hopkins seems deeply conflicted about the 
character of Mrs. Willis: Sappho Clark is initially drawn to her during a meeting and comes 
close to confessing her sins, but in the end is repulsed. Hopkins states 
     [Mrs. Willis] pressed the girl's hand in hers and drew her into a secluded corner. 
For a moment the flood-gates of suppressed feeling flew open in the girl's heart, and 
she longed to lean her head on that motherly breast and unburden her sorrows there. 
     "Mrs. Willis, I am troubled greatly," she said at length. 
     "I am so sorry; tell me, my love, what it is all about." 
     Just as the barriers of Sappho's reserve seemed about to be swept away, there 
followed, almost instantly, a wave of repulsion toward this woman and her 
effusiveness, so forced and insincere. Sappho was very impressionable, and yielded 
readily to the influence which fell like a cold shadow between them. She drew back 
as from an abyss suddenly beheld stretching before her. (155) 
There are, however, no such conflicts with the character of Madame Frances. She is both 
fortune teller and caretaker, deeply African yet deeply connected to the next incarnation of 
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American embodiment through Clark and her son. Even figures such as John Langley consult 
her, looking for some sense of the future. Hopkins states that  
Madam Frances was supposed to be skilled in the occult arts which were once the 
glory of the freshly imported African. Wonderful tales were told of her ability to 
foretell the future…as one gazed upon her he might be pardoned for thinking that 
within that dark house, moulded (sic) upon symmetrical lines, and appearing as 
though cut from purest ebony, albeit somewhat thin and spare, as became one past the 
meridian of life and now upon the road leading downward into the shadows of the last 
valley through which we must pass on our outward journey toward the spheres of 
celestial light, dwelt a rare mind. (199-200) 
Though Madame Frances deals with a source of power not directly cited as religious, she is a 
mediative figure between the resurrective power of Christ and the psychic power of 
individual African Americans. She predicts the future death of John Langley, but also states 
"If you would let an old woman advise you, I should say choose the right path, no matter 
what the cost” (285). It is of note that when Madame Frances’s prediction comes to pass, 
Langley is deeply repentant and he dies on Easter morning. This mediation between the 
resurrective power of Christianity, the resurrection of the body, and the inherent psychic 
strength of African descent is exactly what the final transfiguration of Sappho Clark 
embodies as she also, on the very same Easter Sunday, is reunited with Will Smith. 
The final confrontation with the effects of the physical and sexual violence from the 
past, stressing the importance of repetition in this novel, is Clark’s confrontation with John 
Langley when he attempts to seduce her. I have argued that Sappho Clark embodies and 
materializes seduction as both a product of it and a figure engaged in moral reconstitution 
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through it. Hopkins writes that “Sappho represented the necessary conditions” that activate a 
determined set of characteristics in John Langley, such as greed, perversity, and sensuality 
(91, 226).  This set of necessary conditions, a kind of biological and affective landscape to 
which John reacts, however, mimics the relationship between his great-great uncle, the white 
“cracker” Anson Pollock (221), who attempted to enact “unlawful love” with Grace Montfort 
(45).  John Langley, then, is also a direct product of seduction and rape. Thus, unlike a plot 
of seduction that would feature the formulaic confrontation between a woman who is 
innocence personified and a man who is a villain, Hopkins presents seduction as a deeply 
complex networking, both biologically and literarily, of past and present, of good and bad 
blood, a confrontation in which neither party is unmarked by the legacy of slavery and 
miscegenation, and the primary connection, rather than between Langley and Clark, is the 
connection between Grace Montfort and Sappho Clark. 
 
Conclusion 
Sharon P. Holland states that “the racialized body has to become form and therefore 
fiction to be comprehended, written about, written on.”  Ironically, she calls this condition 
one of the “perpetual individual, neither-nor instead of either-or—your orbit restricted to 
your condition.”46 Hopkins elucidates this very state—the tragic mulatta as form and fiction, 
perpetually individualized yet perpetually without character. The difference, however, is that 
Hopkins attempts to engage form, through both literary genre and racialized bodies, as 
emergent and transfigurative. Form itself is repetitive, but every repetition engages with both 
expectation and potential emergence and transfiguration. Hopkins shows that the active, 
cumulative, and collective process of embodiment—along with the active, cumulative, and 
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collective process of literary development—works in both an accretionary and transfigurative 
way to affect the evolution of mixed race individuals in post-Reconstruction America. The 
accumulations of biological and literary traits come to mark not a new configuration of race 
but a transfiguration of the racial. Together, these techniques, the modeling of both the 
biological and the literary, not only assist Hopkins in exploring a new Negro identity, but 
most importantly, a newly naturalized American body, one that is naturalized through 
literature. 
In the final chapter of this project, Octavia Butler’s novel Dawn also analyzes the 
emergent and transfigurative, but rather than such emergence being positively generative 
amongst humans, Butler presents an inter-species hybridization that comes to focus on 
competing senses of biological determinism that features a dim portrayal of human capacity.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Fingerprinting to Genomics: Technicity and the Assembled Practices of Adaptation 
 
 
In “Biocultures Manifesto,” the introductory essay in the 2007 special issue  
of New Literary History, Lennard J. Davis and David Morris state that the manifesto is “a 
proposal [that] culture and history must be rethought with an understanding of their 
inextricable, if highly variable, relation to biology.” 1 The term they choose to describe this 
relationship is “biocultures.”  They argue that biology often serves as both a “metaphor for 
science” while also describing the intrinsic state of readers and writers, of ourselves as actors 
within a global understanding of biology, history, and culture. As they observe 
To think of science without including an historical and cultural analysis would be like 
thinking of the literary text without the surrounding and embedding weave of 
discursive knowledges active or dormant at particular moments. It is similarly limited 
to think of literature—or to engage in debate concerning its properties or existence—
without considering the network of meanings we might learn from a scientific 
perspective.2 
Biocultures works for Davis and Morris not only as a call to include a scientific perspective 
(and actual science) in literary criticism but also as an organizing disciplinary metaphor. But 
missing from their analysis and their disciplinary desires is a questioning of what is really at 
stake for literary criticism. Is it true that biology is the most potent “metaphor for science”?  
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Donna Haraway, in The Companion Species Manifesto, approaches such issues 
through dog/human relationships that she describes as “a story of co-habitation, co-evolution, 
and embodied cross-species sociality;” her analysis, however, bears an analytical power that 
extends beyond what she refers to as “dogland” (46).  For Haraway, dogs and humans are 
“training each other in acts of communication [they] barely understand” (2). Co-
constitutionality is the key to this kind of training along with an understanding of “co-
habiting an active history” (20).    
Co-constitutionality and the notion of “co-habiting an active history” are important in 
analyzing the connections between technology, biology, and training. One way to explore 
these relations is through “cultural memory.” Marita Sturken, for example, uses the term to 
“define memory that is shared outside the avenues of formal historical discourse yet is 
entangled with cultural products and imbued with cultural meaning”(3). Marianne Hirsch, in 
her work on “testimonial objects,” refers to cultural memory through the work of Aleida 
Assman who divides memory into communicative memory (which includes the memories of 
individuals and families) and cultural memory (which includes national and political 
configurations along with, most importantly for this chapter, archival configurations of 
memory).3 I ask, however, what happens when the cultural becomes the communicative, 
when individual memory, along with processes of identification, emerges out of the archival? 
The historian Pierre Nora observes that “Modern memory is…archival…a gigantic and 
breathtaking effort to store the material vestiges of what we cannot possibly remember” (8).  
Such vestiges have come to include the immense scales of physiological and technological 
mapping, databases and gene scanning that store and encode information referring to 
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inheritance, biogeographical identity; and the vast scale of human origin and global 
migration.  
The archival impact on cultural memory, however, is not a new theme in literary 
texts, and contemporary technological processes do not necessarily bear more analytic weight 
in assessing the co-constitutionality of identification and technology than during earlier eras.  
While I consider, in this chapter, the more contemporary relevance of my research through an 
analysis of the work of Octavia Butler’s 1987 novel Dawn,4 it is in order to demonstrate the 
potential theoretical range of this project. While Mark Twain, in Pudd’nhead Wilson for 
instance, seats his critique within slavery, Butler’s work portends the genomics revolution of 
the 1990s through notions of DNA manipulation and gene trading.5  Both works, however, 
effectively conceptualize notions of human biologicals, genomic capital, biocolonialism, and 
the technologies necessary to support these paradigms.  Additionally, an analysis of Dawn is 
useful for reflecting upon the range of effects authors such as William Wells Brown and 
Pauline E. Hopkins initiated through their use of the materiality of genre itself, incorporating 
literature, region and repetition as a cumulative collection of information reflecting the social 
and cultural development of humans.  
My project, then, moves toward a broader conceptual engagement with what I refer to 
as technicity. Though the term arises out of a philosophical history that stretches back to 
Plato and Aristotle, my project is less concerned with tracing the philosophical history and 
more interested in Arthur Bradley and Louis Armand’s challenge to consider what work the 
term technicity allows us to do now.6 Technicity has been used to describe the 
instrumentality of the things we use, or alternately, as Carol J. Steiner suggests, the term 
describes “a ‘technicity paradigm’ which values objectivity, generalisability and rationality.7 
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Bradley and Armand suggest that “technicity names something which can no longer be seen 
as just a series of prostheses or technical artefacts (sic);” instead, it is “the basic and enabling 
condition of our life-world” (3).  
But what do all of these definitions infer? How do ideas concerning the 
instrumentality of things, rational states, and enabling conditions contribute to the definition 
of a term that I argue suggests both a human state and a relationship to technology or the 
technological?  I would first suggest that technicity neither describes a technological exterior 
nor does it necessarily imply a movement toward the post-human.8 Instead, technicity 
concerns the continuing emergence and co-constitutionality of human identity in relation to 
technology and information. I say informational rather than biological, because how we 
understand ourselves as biological, technical, racial, ethnic, or gendered individuals, emerges 
from our position relative to the acquisition, control, and ownership of knowledge. In turn, 
the accumulation and dispersal of knowledge, especially within the period that my 
dissertation covers, is increasingly, and more self-consciously, technological. And finally, 
how technicity is related to the dispersal and accumulation of knowledge circles round to 
reflect upon the assembled practices of cultural and biological adaptation over time. 
Technology is organized information. How we organize (especially, in terms of my project, 
how we organize through technologies of storing from genres to fingerprinting to DNA) is as 
important as what we know and is also (and now we can reflect back on what Bradley and 
Armand might mean) the “enabling condition” of who we are.  
The range of concerns noted above are particularly important in light of how 
Darwinism and other forms of evolutionary theory introduce a problem in the nineteenth 
century that we are still working through—labile human essence and the resulting breakdown 
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of the line between humans and animals. Of note, however, is that along with new theories of 
evolution in the nineteenth century, come new forms of  “informational practices” that 
contribute to what Phillip Thurtle refers to as “genetic rationality.”9 If evolutionary theory 
breaks down the line between humans and animals, the monumental informational and 
technological shifts that accompany evolutionary and genetic research breaks down the line 
between humans and things: such shifts come to affect notions of adaptation as knowledge 
takes on new material and technological forms especially in terms of technologies for storing 
information. Thurtle describes how inventions and innovations as mundane as file cabinets, 
the organization of labor and time through middle managers, and the use of abstract notation 
allow for larger tracts and fields of information to be catalogued and engaged with ushering 
in advancements in genetic research. Of further note, however, is that the ability to 
technologically organize increasingly vast amounts of information constitutes much of how 
we have come to relate to the changing status of what counts as human essence itself. From 
genre development to fingerprinting to genetic engineering and even DNA itself, it is really 
the ability to control information concerning identity over time that comes to matter to the 
authors I work with in this project. The authors, then, move through questions of 
individuality and race, gender and group, and finally from ethnicity to technicity, the manner 
in which the dynamic interweaving of human essence and scientific and technological 
innovation affects the control and ownership of knowledge, in fact becomes the form that 
knowledge takes. Bradley and Armand ask, whether it is “possible to articulate an ‘originary’ 
technicity that is both fundamentally material and yet inseparable from thought, being or 
language itself? To what extent is technicity thinkable at all?”10 As a final coda to my 
project, I argue that the work of Octavia Butler in Dawn engages with just such concerns: for 
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Butler, technicity becomes “thinkable” because the scale of interpretation—in spite of its 
contextualization within late twentieth-century developments in gene mapping, scanning, and 
database storage—transfers the power of the control of information and the archive into the 
body itself, deftly striking at the dynamic interweaving of essence and ownership, of the 
accumulation and dispersal of knowledge and identity, of technicity.  
 
Human Genomics—Function and Structure, Traits and Technologies 
In the 1987 novel Dawn, a large number of humans are rescued from Earth following 
a nuclear war. They are rescued by an alien race called the Oankali, which translates into 
English as “gene trader” (39). They are a three-gendered species (female, male, and neuter) 
who have been watching humans even before the nuclear event. They intend to interbreed 
with humans to create the next evolutionary formation of their species. The interbreeding, 
rather than occurring, as it might for humans, through external forms of technology such 
genetic manipulation through in vitro fertilization, is a physiological process within the 
Oankali themselves, specifically within the third gender of the ooloi. Even more 
controversial is that the genetic mixing performed by the ooloi to create human/Oankali 
constructs, often occurs by using material such as sperm that the ooloi collect during sexual 
encounters between humans and Oankali. The ooloi stand in, in a sense, for what humans 
think of scientists or genetic engineers, but the ooloi’s passion for humans (sexual and 
scientific) exceeds this: for the Oankali, technological development and acquisitional urges 
have evolved into biological urges through which all desire—personal, scientific, 
technological—centers upon the acquisition of life itself.   
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Since much of the novel concerns the notion of interbreeding through genetic 
engineering and the creation of hybrid creatures who will represent the next rendition of 
Oankali evolution, it might seem as if an explication of how DNA actually functions would 
be helpful in clarifying Octavia Butler’s investment in the Oankali talent for genetic 
engineering. Instead, I argue that the key historical and cultural events that effect authors 
such as Octavia Butler come about through a continuing interest in biological determinism 
arising out of animal studies and their extrapolation onto human behavior, the wave of 
technological developments in molecular biology, and the rising trade in genetic information.  
Robert Cook-Deegan, in his book The Gene Wars: Science, Politics, and the Human 
Genome, states that an analysis of the development of the Human Genome Project (HGP) 
requires an exploration of  “two kinds of history: the technological advances that predated the 
project and the events that followed.”11 In other words, human genetic research, and the 
advent of the HGP, is as much a narrative about how technological innovation shapes culture 
and politics as it is about how genetic research is actually done. Cook-Deegan’s text in many 
ways reflects the methodology of Phillip Thurtle and his formulation of “genetic rationality” 
from the late nineteenth century forward: it is not the intricacies of genetic research itself that 
necessarily form the foundation of how “genetic rationality” develops out of the nineteenth 
century and into the early twentieth century. Instead, Thurtle documents the broad shifts in 
the management of information as foundational to the development of a broad form of 
rationality and technological innovation that ushers in the age of genetics, in fact, ushers in a 
new relationship to rationality and information for everyone. Cook-Deegan notes a similar 
trajectory in the mid- to late-twentieth century through the manner in which the HGP comes 
into being. In addition to the cumulative effects that drive the “technological vision” (11) of 
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the HGP forward on a political, corporate, and cultural tide that comes, over the twentieth 
century, to dominate society’s views on what “big science” makes possible, molecular 
biology’s cascading effects dominate the discourse of population biology which comes to 
shape sociobiology. By the late 1980s, dramatic discoveries concerning the genetic source of 
diseases such as cystic fibrosis and Huntington’s disease run parallel to the controversies 
surrounding the burgeoning field of sociobiology.12  
Gregor Mendel’s research on peas and other plants, which theorized that traits were 
inherited from each parent plant, was published in 1865 and chromosomes were first 
observed within cells in 1877, but it is not until the early twentieth century that these findings 
begin to coalesce into what becomes known as the field of genetics, and it is not until the 
1920s and 1930s that the connection between inheritance and genetic mutation comes to 
inform how natural selection might work within theories of evolution. Though some forms of 
human gene mapping begin as early as 1911, most of the work concerning humans is in some 
ways a continuation of the search for traits that originated in nineteenth-century science and 
has had such a socio-cultural grip on the general public concerning inheritance and notions of 
socio-cultural progress.13  
 In the 1940s, however, molecular biology begins to transform not just genetics, but 
as Cook-Deegan notes, “[invades] field after field, applying increasingly powerful tools to 
questions of greater complexity” (32). He notes that molecular biology’s “distinctive 
signature…was to understand function through molecular structure” (32). By the 1960s, 
population biologist Richard C. Lowentin states that the  
Some of the most fundamental and interesting problems of biology have been solved 
or are very nearly solved by an analytic technique that is now loosely called 
  122 
‘molecular biology.’ But it is not specifically the ‘molecular’ aspect of the biology of 
the last twenty years that has led to its success. It is, rather, the analytic aspect, the 
belief that by breaking systems down into their component parts, by simplifying them 
or using simpler organisms, one can learn about more complex systems. As it 
happens, the problems that were attacked and are being attacked by this method lead 
to answers in terms of molecules and cell organelles.14  
Lowentin sees the methodology of reducing vast amounts of research to the level of 
“molecules and organelles” as particularly damaging to the reputation of his field: 
“Unfortunately, both populations biologists and cellular and molecular biologist have 
become confused about the differences between their modes of thought. It is not the 
case that molecular biology is Cartesian and analytic while population biology is 
holistic.”15 
This notion of researching complex systems by breaking them down into simpler 
components worked well in a number of ways. Since the 1940s and 1950s, the field of 
ethology has developed sets of research questions that have profoundly affected the study of 
animal behavior. Niko Tinbergen’s “why-questions” concerning what he calls the proximate 
mechanisms of causation and development and the ultimate mechanisms of evolution and 
function (adaptiveness), add a clearer depth of evolutionary analysis to the study of 
animals.16 Later in the twentieth century, however, such analyses become controversial when 
new disciplinary fields attempt to extrapolate such research onto human behavior through 
genetics. As Cook-Deegan notes, the profound technological effects arising out of molecular 
genetics “continued to shift conceptual foundations of biology and medicine toward the study 
of DNA.”17  
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An example of the effects of the extrapolation of genetically informed research onto 
other disciplines is the development of the field of sociobiology. Edward O. Wilson, who 
published Sociobiology: The New Synthesis in 1975 and is one of the founding scholars of 
this controversial field, defines sociobiology as the “systematic study of the biological basis 
of all social behavior,” or, as he states in Human Nature, sociobiology is the “extension of 
population biology and evolutionary theory to social organization.”18 Though Wilson and 
others claim to only be describing behavior, critics claim that the field is prescriptive as well 
descriptive. 
George W. Barlow traces the roots of the controversies concerning sociobiology as 
far back as the critique of Darwin, after the publication of The Expression of Emotions in 
Man and Animal (1871), “because of the inference that even the moral sensitivities of 
humans resulted from organic evolution.”19 Barlow states that there was a particular divide 
that developed between practitioners of the new field of ethology and North American 
experimental psychologists who were devoted to exploring the behavior of humans to the 
exclusion of all other animals. Barlow believes that much of the argumentation between these 
fields later comes to infect the controversies regarding biological determinism in the field of 
sociobiology.  
My main point in delineating this history is that these debates were often fought out 
in mainstream publications in addition to the formation of groups such as the Sociobiology 
Study Group in the 1970s. Additionally, though Wilson seems to have taken an unfair 
amount of direct personal criticism that should have more broadly focused on a variety of 
works, rather than just Sociobiology, he did speculate on the connections between genes and 
complex social behavior and also suggested that sociobiology would come to replace many 
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of the social sciences.20 Such speculative notions from a well-known scientist, along with the 
virulent public critique, did affect public discourse and many disciplines. As Anne Fausto-
Sterling notes, the field of sociobiology “distinguished itself by a relatively unrelenting focus 
on questions relating to reproduction, including an abiding and very Darwinian concern with 
sexual dimorphism” and an assumption that “even complex behaviors probably respond to 
selection as if the traits in question resulted from the actions of a simple set of alleles.”21  
The mapping of the human genome, the articulation of complex behaviors as arising 
from biological and genetic roots, and an “unrelenting focus on questions relating to 
reproduction” are all very much a part of the narrative within Dawn. There is an additional 
development during this period, however, that I argue is a concern within Butler’s novel and 
figures across the other works in my dissertation. The surge in biotechnology in the period 
following World War II affects all collected biological materials, old and new, as they 
become newly instrumentalized because of technological breakthroughs in gene mapping, 
scanning, and database development.22 Cases such as those involving the cervical cancer 
cells taken from Henrietta Lacks in the 1950s and the cells from John Moore’s spleen in the 
1970s involve what Kaushik Rajan refers to as human biologicals, the growth of genomic 
capital through the development of human cell lines in the twentieth and twenty-first century. 
Biological materials taken from both Lacks and Moore were developed, without their 
consent, into the HeLa and Mo cell lines. Each cell line has been reproduced countless times 
and sold for use in untold numbers of international research projects.23 
The use of human biologicals and concerns over consent, capital, and identity are not 
new issues. For example, Mark Twain’s use of fingerprints in Pudd’nhead Wilson is an early 
instance of a biological archive. Moreover, the technological identification of Tom Driscoll 
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as a specific human is the very event that leads to his devolution, to his reduction from that of 
a subject to a saleable piece of inventory (115). Octavia Butler’s novel Dawn exhibits similar 
concerns. The distance between the novels, then, is not a factor of time in the sense of a 
narrative of technological progress, the nineteenth versus the twentieth century. Instead, time 
serves, first, as a notation of when the different sites of biological access were developed. 
Secondly, the comparison of the novels reveals that from the era of slavery to the era of 
human genomics, the technicity that organizes biological and technological identification, 
classification, and marketability for individuals and groups of humans, relies on similar 
notions of gender, race, and reproduction. The technologies of fingerprinting in Pudd'nhead 
Wilson and genetic engineering in Dawn do not simply mediate between bodies, biological 
archives, and the associated technologies; they importantly highlight that the technicity of 
narrative is inseparable from bodies, biological archives, and technologies. Just as technicity 
is not a paradigm lateral to biocultures, neither is narrative lateral to technicity. Technicity, as 
with other cultural and technological relationality, includes technologies of narrative, and 
technologies of narrative come to include the varieties of archival and print culture discussed 
in Chapter 2 of this project, concerning Mark Twain’s novel Pudd’nhead Wilson, and the 
work of this present chapter on Octavia Butler’s novel Dawn. 
 
Biological Determinism and the Control of Information  
Walter Benn Michaels suggests the following about the cultural and biological crux 
often posited in science fiction: 
Perhaps we could say that in science fiction the choice between imagining aliens as 
physically different from humans and imagining them as culturally different from 
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humans should be understood as a choice between ways of imagining not the 
difference between humans and aliens but the difference between humans. To insist 
that the difference between humans and aliens is physical is to insist on the 
insignificance of differences between humans; to insist that the difference between 
humans and aliens is cultural is to insist on the importance of differences between 
humans.24 
Butler, however, challenges the basic divisions that Michaels suggests between physical and 
cultural differences in science fiction by insisting that culture too is physical, and that what 
exists between Oankalis and humans are two competing systems of biological determinism.  
The form of determinism that most concerns the Oankali is what they believe to be 
the biological, and thus the genetic, capacity of humans to be morally or ethically 
responsible. The Oankali, as rigidly as any alarming model of a sociobiologist, repeatedly 
drive home the point that humans are “fatally flawed” (36). The Oankali ooloi (the third 
gender) have mapped and stored the entire human genome, and from this mapping, and the 
observation of humans over the two hundred and fifty years since the nuclear war, have, with 
complete confidence, come to a final judgment concerning humankind. Describing the 
connections between genes and complex social behavior, Jdahya, the Oankali male who will 
soon be one of Lilith’s mates, explains to her that humans 
have a mismatched pair of genetic characteristics. Either alone would have been 
useful, would have aided the survival of your species. But the two together are lethal. 
It was only a matter of time before they destroyed you…You are potentially one of 
the most intelligent species we’ve found…[and you] are hierarchical…When human 
intelligence served it instead of guiding it, when human intelligence did not even 
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acknowledge it as a problem, but took pride in it or did not notice it at all…I think 
your people did not realize what a dangerous thing they were doing. (36-7) 
The Oankali extend this interpretation of the “fatally flawed” condition of humans to 
include all human artifacts. The manipulation of human DNA for breeding, then, is not 
sufficient: the Oankali will return humans to an Earth stripped of all humanly constructed 
materiality. The Oankali coerce humans (though they do not consider it coercion) into 
accepting their form of culture, which consists of intense biological bonding that shapes the  
novel form of family, sexual pleasure, and reproduction between the two species. Humans, 
however, can only focus on the loss of themselves as a species and the loss of their culture. 
When Lilith, the African American woman that the Oankali choose to “awaken” and train the 
first group of survivors who will return to Earth, discovers that the Oankali purposely wiped 
out nearly all human artifacts from the Earth, she says “‘You destroyed what wasn’t 
yours…You completed an insane act’” (32-3). In response to the destruction of human 
culture that Lilith finds so grossly insensitive that she compares it to the nuclear holocaust, 
Jdahya responds, “You’ll begin again…in areas that are clean of radioactivity and history” 
(32).   
The pairing of the words “radioactivity” and “history” in this final sentence suggests 
the depth of Oankali conviction concerning the genetically compromised status of the human 
species. Humans themselves, however, find little in their own behavior, post-nuclear 
apocalypse, to counter what the Oankali forward as fact. The first adult human that Lilith is 
allowed to visit is Paul Titus. Titus is an adult now but was fourteen years old when rescued 
from Earth. Lilith’s first response to being left alone in a room with a man is caution that 
soon turns to fear. Her fear is justified when she resists his sexual advances and he attempts 
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to rape her and then violently beats her: “They said I could do it with you. They said you 
could stay here if you wanted to. And you had to go and mess it up! He kicked her hard. The 
last sound she heard before she lost consciousness was his ragged, shouting curse.” (82-94) 
When Lilith is left with the task of awakening and training the first group of humans who 
will return to Earth with the Oankali, she finds that she is “afraid of her own people and 
afraid for them” (118). Many of the humans live up to her deepest fears. Just as with Paul 
Titus, the awakened humans, especially the men, try to dominate and become violent.  
The Oankali themselves, however, are a deeply biologically determined species. 
Though they initiate each of their evolutionary phases, the planning of the phases is rigidly 
controlled. There are three groups for each evolutionary shift—Toaht who stay with the ship; 
Dinso who interbreed with the newly selected species; and Akjai, the new Oankali constructs 
who will eventually leave on a new ship many generations into the future. Most interesting, 
however, is the fact that these levels of control, and acquisition of life itself, is a biological 
and genetic imperative. Jdahya states 
We’re not hierarchical, you see. We never were. But we are powerfully acquisitive. 
We acquire new life—seek it, investigate it, manipulate it, sort it, use it. We carry the 
drive to do this in a minuscule cell within a cell—a tiny organelle within every cell of 
our bodies…One of the meanings of Oankali is gene trader. Another is that 
organelle—the essence of ourselves, the origin of ourselves. (39)   
In other words, the Oankali have a cellular organ with a function that specifically regulates 
their evolutionary drive and, thus, their behavior.  
What counts as essence for the Oankali, then, is not the qualities of physical 
appearance and cultural accumulation that so consume humans. Essence is an actual 
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organelle that functions as archive and memory, as a technology that enhances and develops 
their skills as genetic engineers, and most importantly, strictly organizes information and 
controls access to knowledge. The emergence of the species no longer concerns co-
constitutionality; instead, technicity is, constitutionally, who they are. There is no longer a 
position in which to act relative to the acquisition, control, ownership, and reproduction of 
knowledge—the Oankali are the organelle and their biological emergence is informed by that 
drive. 
Becoming technicity is, I argue, at the heart of where the concerns of this novel lie. 
Butler writes Dawn during an era in which biological function and structure meet with the 
technology of molecular biology and deeply influence the extrapolation of evolutionary and 
animal studies onto human behavior; she writes as the Human Genome Project is in 
ascendance, and as, internationally, DNA sequencing machines run continuously at both 
private and public institutions. Kaushik Rajan suggests that this period changes our 
relationship to words such as “’life,’ ‘capital,’ ‘fact,’ ‘exchange,’ and ‘value’” as the life 
sciences increasingly become information sciences.25 Octavia Butler deftly brings these 
qualities to bear on the very structure of biological and social life through the Oankali figure 
of the ooloi.  
 
The Gender of Science 
 In my earlier chapter on Mark Twain and his 1894 novel Pudd’nhead Wilson, David 
Wilson states that each human’s fingerprint is “his physiological autograph” “by which he 
can always be identified—and that without shade of doubt or question” (108). But 
Pudd'nhead Wilson is not a novel that is simply concerned with the technological capacity 
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for identification; instead the novel is concerned with how that capacity emerges out of a 
crisis of visualization in terms of race and identity. As visualization fails (in terms of racial 
categorization), and technologies that capture notions of the internalization and the 
biologicalization of identification emerge, the lone person who controls the archive (the 
expert, the researcher, the collector, the scientist) becomes a more organized and coherent 
figure. David Wilson, purposely sketched out as the odd, ironic loner, the “pudd’nhead” who 
barely has work or friends, who stays in Dawson’s Landing for twenty years without 
marrying, is such a figure.  
Though Wilson appears to collect “finger-marks” avocationally, asking the people of 
Dawson’s Landing to “pass their hands through their hair…and then make a thumb-mark on 
a glass strip,” he refers to the collection of “finger-marks” as his “‘records’” (7).  The 
collection seems to serve no purpose, the formation of an archive prior to any public 
instrumentality. For Wilson, however, there is a rational aesthetic pleasure in the acquisition 
of multiple samples, the growth of the archive, and careful study even prior to a kind of 
public instrumentality. He is compelled to collect. There is even a quality of sensuality and 
mystery as Wilson “often studied his records, examining and poring over them with 
absorbing interest until far into the night” (7). Of note is how the pleasure of the prints, the 
mystery of the lines of the thumb, are as potent for Wilson as any observation of actual 
human interaction.  
As the archive of fingerprints is instrumentalized by Wilson in order to solve a 
murder, as the prints are not only brought into the courtroom but displayed as “pantograph 
enlargements” scrutinized by the jury and courtroom audience, he quite sensationally affects 
how the observers of the trial will thereafter view a portion of their anatomy (105).  The 
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pantographs, even more than the original fingerprints themselves, demonstrate how such 
archives exist as both continuous and discontinuous with the bodies from which the materials 
originate.26 The fingerprints do represent the men Wilson claims they belong to, and even 
contain hair oil and skin cells from across the lives of the two men. But what counts in the 
end is that the prints are collected, stored, analyzed, and controlled by just one person, David 
Wilson, who as the white, male lawyer and the steward of the archive of fingerprints, has the 
racial, rational, legal, and gendered power to shape the technology and narrative in a 
particular manner.    
Wilson’s role reflects Phillip Thurtle’s understanding of how people in the late 
nineteenth century develop new associations to “informational practices” and the resulting 
paradigm of “genetic rationality” that arises from innovations in both the understanding and 
organization of more vast amounts of information.27 I argue that Octavia Butler publishes 
Dawn in an era similarly involved with technological and informational shifts. In Butler’s 
novel, it is the ooloi, the third gender of the Oankali, neither male nor female, that makes for 
an interesting comparison with figures such as Wilson. In a reflection of her era, the type of 
control exerted over information and reproduction moves from a single person to a single 
gender. Additionally, technology concerning information and reproduction becomes 
completely biological and is functionally enshrined within the ooloi. 
The ooloi are described as particularly alien to humans. With the “sea-slug” 
appearance of their tentacles (24) along with the two larger “sensory arms” of “cool, hard 
flesh” (159), humans express disgust and terror when confronted with these beings. In spite 
of these alien qualities, however, I argue that the ooloi are as understandably human, if more 
invoking of fear, as David Wilson. Twain introduces Wilson as an outsider welcomed into 
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the community once the value of his collection and “records” are acknowledged (7). What is 
proven in the court case that Wilson wins through the forensics of fingerprinting is not, 
however, simply who committed murder. The uniqueness of the fingerprint, and its role as 
both the site and the development of a technology that specifically identifies particular 
humans, is also the medium by which a person is stripped of individuality and even 
personhood as seen when Tom Driscoll, the murderer, is demoted from white heir to slave to 
“erroneous inventory” (115). Thus, the technological organization of information in 
Pudd’nhead Wilson takes on the traits of the social organization of race.  
The difference between a figure such as David Wilson and the ooloi in Dawn is, first, 
of course, the period of reference. The Oankali “trade” in organic human materials parallels 
what Kaushik Rajan refers to as human biologicals, the development of human cell lines in 
the twentieth and twenty-first century.28 The development of human cell lines may seem 
distantly related to Twain’s use of fingerprints; the distance, however, reflects when the sites 
of technological and biological access were developed and not the paradigm of categorization 
behind each effort. In other words, the desires that organize biological and technological 
identification, classification, and marketability, from the era of slavery to the era of human 
genomics, often rely on similar notions of reproduction—notions that work against what 
Sarah Franklin refers to as the “unexpected liveliness of the [biological] objects 
themselves.”29 
As if to emphasize just such parallels, Butler introduces a system of prints constructed 
by the Oankali that are organized around a number of representational and technological 
practices that suggest a relationship to nineteenth to late twentieth-century technologies of 
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identification and memory. The prints, in a fashion reminiscent of Twain’s work with 
fingerprinting, intermediate between memory and genealogy, biology and identity.30 
 
The Instrumentalization of Prints  
When Lilith Iyapo prepares to awaken the first group of humans on the Oankali ship, 
she examines a series of pictures of them:   
The pictures looked alive enough to speak. In each one, there was nothing except the 
head and shoulders of the subject against a gray background.  None of them had that 
blank, wanted-poster look that snapshots could have produced. These pictures had a 
lot to say even to non-Oankali observers about who their subjects were—or who the 
Oankali thought they were. (125) 
The subjects of these pictures do not know that such images were produced, and though 
Lilith states that each picture “looked like, even felt like photos,” they are instead defined as 
“paintings,” drawn by the Oankali with their own body fluids, and “contained print memories 
of their subjects” (125). The prints, then, are not simply a mimicry of biological reproduction 
now materialized archivally. The archive itself, even in the form of a print, is organic and a 
potential actor in this interspecies drama. The prints exist as the central acquisitory object 
and resource for the Oankali but also as a form of their obsession and sexual desire—a kind 
of metaphorical pornography of sex and reproduction that resides specifically in the ooloi 
and creates a deep sense of dread in the humans.   
Lilith’s violent interaction with Paul Titus, his paranoid interpretations of Oankali 
technology along with his attempted rape of Lilith, highlight how Oankali sex and 
reproduction come to be viewed by humans: 
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They took stuff from men and women who didn’t even know each other and put it 
together and made babies…Or maybe they use one of their prints—and don’t ask me 
what a print is. But if they’ve got one of you, they can use it to make another you 
even if you’ve been dead for a hundred years and they haven’t got anything at all left 
of your body returned to it.  (93) 
Nikanj, Lilith’s ooloi, confirms Paul’s information saying that the “Toaht desperately need 
more of your kind to make a true trade…The Toaht have a print of you—of every human we 
brought on board” (97). When Lilith objects, Nikanj replies: 
What we’ve preserved of you isn’t living tissue. It’s memory. A gene map, your 
people might call it—though they couldn’t have made one like those we remember 
and use. It’s more like what they would call a mental blueprint. A plan for the 
assembly of one specific human being: You. A tool for reconstruction.” (97) 
Crucially, however, the existence of the prints reconfigures exactly what memory comes to 
entail. Paul Titus, though violent and paranoid, is correct when he states “don’t ask me what 
a print is” (92). The prints deepen the conflict of just what counts as human in the novel 
because the prints represent, similar to David Wilson’s collection of “finger-marks,” an 
actual person, but how that representation is instrumentalized in the future is distinct from 
individual identity or even speciation. For the humans in the novel, there is no satisfactory 
account of how the biological materials will be used, and the utilization of the prints, even at 
this point, lies completely outside of most human’s conception of reproduction.31  
Print technology is simply one of the methods of reproduction that the Oankali use 
that come to trouble Lilith as she attempts to understand the full ramifications of Oankali 
reproduction and what her effective position (along with other humans) to reproduction will 
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be. As I mentioned earlier, all Oankali contain in their cells an organelle that carries the 
acquisitive drive for life that defines the essence of the Oankali as a species. Additionally, the 
ooloi store and process genetic and biological material within themselves and can then make 
biological and genetic changes in others. Nikanj, for example, has “sampled” Lilith a number 
of times, and such “sampling” has allowed it to make a number of changes to her body such 
as memory enhancement, added strength, and the ability to heal more quickly (56). After 
making the first enhancement, which gives Lilith eidetic memory, she learns, however, that 
the changes made by Nikanj leave “a mark,” a chemical bond that, unbeknownst to Lilith, 
now makes Nikanj her future mate (109). The ooloi sequence and map genomes, store 
biological materials, act as both database and personal memory bank, and in a twist that is 
simultaneously as radical as it is conservative, Butler incorporates the ooloi—the geneticist, 
engineer, physician, and researcher—into the most intimate structures of family and kinship. 
The ooloi, the third gender of the Oankali species, participate fully in acts of sexual 
reproduction—and obsessive desire—but they also profess complete objectivity and 
complete genetic control of reproduction. As with Twain’s expert and archive, there are 
elements of desire and pleasure, containment, classification, and control. In the world that 
Butler has constructed, however, these elements are completely biologized.  
The transfer of these elements that arise out of the late nineteenth century and develop 
across the twentieth century, even though based on an alien gender’s obsession with humans, 
remain entwined within the practices of obtaining information and the practices of sexual 
reproduction. As Jdahya tells Lilith, “Your bodies are fatally flawed. The ooloi perceived this 
at once. At first it was very hard for them to touch you. Then you became on obsession with 
them. Now it’s hard for them to let you alone” (36). Later in the novel Joseph, Lilith’s first 
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human sexual partner says, “You don’t need us!...You’ve created your own human beings, 
poor bastards. Make them your partners.” In reply, Nikanj says, “We…do need you…A 
partner must be biologically interesting, attractive to us, and you are fascinating. You are 
horror and beauty in rare combination. In a very real way, you’ve captured us, and we can’t 
escape” (154). Even as they admit immense attraction, the attraction seems grounded first in 
biology and information, in the mapping of humans and the consideration of how the 
evolutionary shift should move forward. Secondly, these informational practices seem to 
produce an inordinate sexual attraction through chemical bonding which provides for an easy 
accommodation of the human within Oankali family and kinship groupings.   
But why does this expression of human/alien bonding in which the ooloi, advanced 
evolutionary and genetic engineers, seem to matter? What, finally, do I understand as one of 
the most important critical impressions this text forwards? I argue that there are two final 
points concerning the relevancy of Butler’s novel in the 1980s and 1990s: the first point 
concerns the overall primacy of the gene and its effect on family, sexual reproduction, and 
the evolutionary importance of pleasure in this novel. Secondly, how the techniques of 
reproduction finally come to reflect upon contemporary formations of reproduction and 
cloning.  
 
Gene Primacy 
In 1978, in the first edition of his book The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins states that 
the  
argument of [The Selfish Gene] is that we, and all other animals, are machines created 
by our genes…our genes have survived, in some cases for millions of years, in a 
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highly competitive world. This entitles us to expect certain qualities in our genes. I 
shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless 
selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual 
behavior. However, as we shall see, there are special circumstances in which a gene 
can achieve its own selfish goals best by fostering a limited form of altruism at the 
level of individual animals.”32  
In many ways, the idea of the selfish gene dominates Butler’s work, particularly in reference 
to “fatally flawed” humans (36). All that humans managed to accomplish on Earth was its 
utter destruction with all of their intelligence and technological innovation feeding into 
hierarchy in a manner that the Oankali believe could never have done anything but finally 
destroy them. And no matter what configuration of humans Lilith awakens and trains, or how 
she works to structure the dynamics of the group, humans continue to only live up to the 
deterministic set of behaviors that the Oankali say are genetically inscribed and these 
behaviors include racism, sexism, and violence against women. In other words, both 
consciously and genetically, humans fail Lilith, as they also failed her on Earth by engaging 
in nuclear warfare and self-annihilation.  
But in arguing for the final primacy of the gene in this text, the Oankali, in many 
ways, fare no better as an example of genetic determinism than humans. With their dual 
obsessions involving human genomics and sexual desire, they offer a sense of biological 
egalitarianism stripped of most forms of cultural expression. Sexual activity is not directly 
physical; it is a form of “[n]eural stimulation” intermediated by the ooloi, and once humans 
are secured as mates in a family, they can no longer touch each other (169). While this 
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method of sex and reproduction is the standard method for the Oankali, the loss, for humans, 
of the ability to touch those with whom they are intimate is a huge loss.  As Lilith states: 
An ooloi needed a male and female pair to be able to play its part in 
reproduction, but it neither needed nor wanted two-way contact between that male 
and female. Oankali males and females never touched each other sexually. That 
worked fine for them. It could not possibly work for human beings.” (220) 
Humans are even more disturbed by the notion that the Oankali know more (or believe they 
do) about what humans want sexually than humans know about themselves. Thus, when 
humans resist Oankali sexual advances, ooloi such as Nikanj consistently repeat a mantra that 
no really means yes: 
[Joseph] pulled his arm free. “You said I could choose. I’ve made my choice.” 
“You have, yes.” It opened his jacket with its many-fingered true hands and 
stripped the garment from him. When he would have backed away, it held him. It 
managed to lie down on the bed with him without seeming to force him down. “You 
see. Your body has made a different choice.” 
He struggled violently for several seconds, then stopped. “Why are you doing 
this?” he demanded. (189). 
The Oankali, at heart, do not care. Or rather, cannot care. Though they claim to “revere life” 
and human “cultures” (153-54), their interest in essence and origin remains confined to 
themselves. The concept of consent, most especially in regards to their evolutionary drive, is 
meaningless as their acquisitionary drive and chemically-bound families are all that matter.  
In Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson, fingerprinting, in the end, consolidates 
whiteness, even as the novel reveals the biological impossibility and cultural fragility of 
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categorizations of race. The Oankali interest in essence and origin is, likewise, confined to 
themselves. No matter how genetically mixed human and Oankali become, the next 
evolutionary configuration will still be Oankali. In a kind of reversal of the one-drop racial 
configuration of Twain’s era, any construct of human and Oankali will include the organelle 
in each cell. Humanity itself will be primarily outside of the scope of Oankali concern. The 
Oankali utility of pleasure combined with genetic control becomes what Sarah Franklin 
might refer to as “the embodiment of a technique” where acquisition and trade replace (and 
the chemical bonding and genetic engineering of family and kinship breeds out) the affect of 
hierarchy, if not, essentially, hierarchy itself.  
What Dawn explores are competing sets of biological determinism that define the 
technicity inherent in each species. Broadly speaking, it may appear as if the technological 
ordering of the Oankali body represents biology in control versus the relationship of the 
human to technology, which represents biology out of control.33 Perhaps what the novel 
really asks us to consider is how our relationship to technology reflects upon the assembled 
practices of cultural and biological adaptation over time. Technology is organized 
information and how we organize comes to be not only as important as what we know but is 
also be the “enabling condition” of who we are.  
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